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M any UN peacebuilding interventions take place in settings governed by authoritarian regimes and are often 
overtly designed to overcome deeply entrenched 
patterns of autocratic rule. Whether large 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations 
like those in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Mali, and Central African Republic 
(CAR), smaller peacebuilding missions in places 
like Guinea-Bissau and Haiti, or peacebuilding 
projects in non-mission settings like Kyrgyzstan 
and Cameroon, the legacies of autocratic rule 
present some of the most direct and immediate 
challenges for international intervenors. In fact, 
peacebuilding has seldom resulted in a complete 
transformation from an authoritarian system 
to an open democratic one. Instead, most 
systems retain some form of authoritarianism 
via a continuation of a particular ruler, ruling 
party, or consolidation of power in a small 
elite.1 More worryingly, many post-conflict 
settings experience a further concentration of 
power and even greater repression as regimes 
take advantage of new forms of economic 
development and international support.2 In 
some cases, there is evidence that peacebuilding 
support may have contributed to increasing 
levels of authoritarianism, even while advancing 
other important goals.3
This project explores the ways in which 
peacebuilding may unintentionally enable 
authoritarian tendencies, despite its stated goal 
of more inclusive forms of governance. We build 
on scholarship that has analysed the impacts of 
democratization efforts in post-conflict settings,4 
and the substantial literature describing how 
authoritarian systems may prove resilient to 
external efforts to transform them, including 
by instrumentalizing democratic institutions, 
controlling resources, and emplacing political 
structures that tend to centralize authority in 
a small elite.5 While helpful in understanding 
the politics of authoritarian rule, this literature 
seldom offers an analysis of the causal 
relationships between peacebuilding and 
authoritarianism, leaving policymakers and 
practitioners without a clear framework to 
understand the impact of their interventions. 
The fact that peacebuilding is one amongst many 
factors influencing authoritarianism means 
that its possible contribution to tendencies of 
centralization and political repression often go 
unnoticed.
The principal argument of this project is that 
peacebuilding support may enable authoritarian 
forms of governance in two ways: (1) by providing 
material and other resources to the central State, 
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thereby allowing it to consolidate control over 
key institutions and levers of power, and (2) by 
signalling in ways that lower the perceived costs 
of autocratic, non-democratic forms of rule and 
may help to shield leaders from accountability 
for their actions.6 Together, these operate as a 
causal mechanism through which international 
peacebuilders may bolster authoritarian 
tendencies within political systems even while 
ostensibly promoting democratic forms of 
rule. In contrast, where peacebuilding support 
diversifies its resources to a broader range of 
stakeholders and sends signals that the political 
costs of non-democratic forms of governance 
may be high, it should contribute to reductions 
in authoritarian tendencies. While these impacts 
may be difficult to isolate – especially given that 
the UN is often a small player in the broader 
peacebuilding landscape – an examination 
of international peacebuilding support more 
generally across a range of settings will facilitate 
a better understanding of these dynamics at play. 
This approach will also help us understand the 
dilemmas facing peacebuilders who must often 
choose between supporting State institutions 
as key actors in conflict prevention, while also 
recognizing that authoritarian governments 
may instrumentalize the same institutions 
to consolidate power. Moreover, it offers an 
evidence base for policymakers and major 
donors hoping to understand how to translate 
elite bargains into more sustainable forms of 
peace.7
This project not only explores the relationship 
between peacebuilding and authoritarianism, 
but also aims to provide a usable framework 
and set of recommendations for policymakers 
and practitioners to avoid some of the common 
pitfalls and ensure that peacebuilding support 
is not distorted or co-opted. To that end, this 
paper is organized as follows: Part One reviews 
the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding 
and authoritarian governance, noting that the 
bulk of scholarship on peacebuilding provides 
few causal explanations for the prevalence 
and resilience of highly centralized forms of 
governance. It then lays out the research design 
and the use of the two-part causal mechanism 
described above. Part Two illustrates how 
these dynamics play out in a range of country 
settings where the UN has invested significantly 
in peacebuilding support. The analysis compares 
across in-depth country case studies on DRC, 
Haiti, and Cambodia (see case studies below), 
and draws on an assessment of peacebuilding 
funding flows in eight other countries.8 
Part Three builds on the country comparison 
and provides a framework for policymakers and 
practitioners involved in peacebuilding, offering 
key considerations and suggested approaches 
to planning future interventions.
It should be noted at the outset that this paper 
is primarily focused on UN-led peacebuilding 
efforts, though it analyses a broad range of 
international peacebuilding support and 
provides recommendations that can be applied 
to bilateral donors and international financial 












C H A P T E R  1
What is authoritarianism? 
This paper defines authoritarianism as a political 
system in which power and resources have 
been centralized in a person or elite group in 
a manner that limits meaningful political and 
economic inclusion and instrumentalizes key 
State institutions towards concentrations of 
power.9 This aligns with much of the scholarship 
defining authoritarianism largely on the basis 
of a combination of a lack of political space for 
elections and the consolidation of power in a 
small elite.10 For example, Bartusevičius and 
Skaaning have proposed that political systems 
be classified in terms of their relationship to 
the electoral process, suggesting five types 
ranging from non-electoral to “polyarchies.”11 
Larry Diamond, following well-known sources 
like Polity and others, has categorized political 
systems on the basis of levels of repression and 
political space.12 Hadenius and Teorell have 
created a typology based on the structures and 
processes leaders use to concentrate and retain 
power.13 And leading expert Barbara Geddes has 
demonstrated that authoritarianism can range 
from highly personalist regimes to those where 
power is located in a military group, a small 
elite, or in multiple parties; in simplified terms, 
the greater the concentration of power in an 
individual, the more authoritarian the regime.14 
Common across these approaches is an 
understanding that authoritarianism is the 
result of concentrations of power in a small 
elite, limitations on the political space available 
for differences of views, and often opaque, 
patrimonial systems for distribution of wealth. 
There is also a strong consensus that highly 
authoritarian regimes can present the outward 
trappings of democracy, maintaining State 
institutions that appear to foster open political 
space, while in fact instrumentalizing such 
institutions to consolidate power in a small 
central elite.15 The presence of parliaments, 
elections, ministries, and courts does not 
necessarily indicate an open system, but may 
in fact point to deeply entrenched forms of 
authoritarianism.16
Authoritarian systems have proven 
extraordinarily resilient, often outlasting 
predictions of their demise by decades and 
resisting external efforts to transform them. To 
persist, such regimes must overcome significant 
challenges, including the need to maintain 
elite constellations of power in the face of 
external threats, suppress social mobilization 
by disenfranchised groups, escape sanctions 
and other external pressure points, and control 
a public narrative of stability and progress.17 
Autocratic rulers require domestic leverage – 
often in the form of political and economic capital, 
which can be achieved through the tools of 
repression, propaganda, and instrumentalization 
of State institutions. But they also frequently 
rely on a range of external sources of support, 
including direct help from powerful States that 
may provide financial assistance and/or advice 
on co-opting opponents. What are often termed 
“linkages” between authoritarian regimes allow 
two or more political elites to subvert sanctions 
regimes and bolster respective economies, while 
sharing lessons on repressive forms of rule.18 
Equally important are forms of “diffusion,” by 
which one authoritarian regime may influence 
the trajectory or practices of another in largely 
unintentional ways, such as where one leader 
mimics the strategy of another that has proven 
particularly effective in a different setting.19
How Peacebuilding 
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While linkage and diffusion are often studied with 
reference to connections between authoritarian 
regimes in different countries, this paper 
examines how international peacebuilding can 
create distinct forms of linkage and diffusion 
between international peacebuilders and host 
countries. One unintended consequence of these 
kinds of connections can involve international 
enabling of authoritarian rule. This requires an 
understanding of what peacebuilding is, and how 
it interacts with authoritarian systems.
What is peacebuilding?
The term “peacebuilding” emerged roughly 40 
years ago via the work of Johan Galtung who 
emphasized that sustainable peace should be 
achieved by addressing “root causes” of violent 
conflict and supporting indigenous capacities 
for conflict resolution.20 Peacebuilding became a 
central concept for the UN in Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace, and then 
again in the 2000 Brahimi Report that defined 
it as “activities undertaken on the far side of 
conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace 
and provide the tools for building on those 
foundations something that is more than just 
the absence of war.”21 In 2005, the concept came 
to the fore with the creation of the Peacebuilding 
Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and 
the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), all 
intended to fill what former Secretary-General 
Annan called a “gaping hole” in the UN’s capacity 
to support countries’ transitions from violent 
conflict to peace.22 Subsequent policy processes, 
such as the Secretary-General’s 2007 Policy 
Committee decision and a series of UN reports 
starting in 2009, gradually evolved the concept 
of peacebuilding away from an overriding focus 
on intervention after conflict to a broader range 
of engagements to prevent lapse or relapse into 
large-scale violence.23
In 2015 a high-ranking UN Advisory Group 
of Experts (AGE) defined peacebuilding as 
synonymous with “sustaining peace,” understood 
as “not only efforts to prevent relapse into conflict 
but also to prevent lapse into conflict in the first 
place.”24 Its definition became the basis for the 
2016 twin Security Council/General Assembly 
resolutions, which broadly defined sustaining 
peace as:
“A goal and a process to build a common 
vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of 
all segments of the population are taken into 
account, which encompasses activities aimed 
at preventing the outbreak, escalation, 
continuation and recurrence of conflict, 
addressing root causes, assisting parties to 
conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national 
reconciliation and moving towards recovery, 
reconstruction and development.”25
© UN Photo/UNAMID - Albert Gonzalez Farran
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As such, there is no strict definition of 
peacebuilding in the UN system, at least in terms 
of listing activities, but it is understood broadly as 
cross-cutting efforts to reduce the risks of large-
scale violence by promoting inclusive forms of 
conflict resolution and governance; identifying 
and helping to address the root causes of conflict; 
and building sustainable financing models to 
help societies achieve long-term stability.26 
As the 2018 UN reform process highlighted, 
peacebuilding is not a specific set of activities or 
owned by a particular set of actors, but is more of 
a “hinge” that brings the security, human rights, 
and development pillars together around the 
common objective of conflict prevention. As such, 
a range of activities can ultimately be understood 
as always-already containing peacebuilding 
objectives, such as security sector reforms (SSR), 
disarmament, community dialogue, and human 
rights advocacy etc.,27 while yet other more 
routine development and humanitarian activities 
also can help reduce the stakes of conflict and 
thereby reduce the risks of violence.28
It is worth highlighting here the relationship 
between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. While 
traditional forms of peacekeeping were fairly 
restricted to the security arrangements of peace 
agreements, multidimensional peacekeeping 
has increasingly concerned itself with a broader 
array of tasks, creating a heavy overlap with 
peacebuilding. Operations as diverse as those in 
Cambodia, Haiti, and DRC all have peacekeeping 
mandates with substantial peacebuilding tasks, 
including support to rule of law institutions, 
addressing root causes, local conflict mediation, 
and supporting broader transformations in the 
relationship between State and citizenry. This 
project does not draw bright lines between 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping and instead 
focuses on the dilemmas that arise when the UN 
and its partners are asked to support democratic 
transformations in a range of settings. The 
authors do, however, acknowledge that settings 
involving large peacekeeping operations tend 
to include different dynamics around issues like 
host State consent and use of force, which are 
addressed below.
Peacebuilding in authoritarian 
settings
International peacebuilding frequently must 
address systems of authoritarianism. Civil 
conflicts tend to break out in authoritarian 
systems, which in turn create fertile conditions for 
conflict relapse and recurrence.29 Civil wars erode 
State institutions, destroy public confidence in 
the State, damage economic development, and 
tend to exacerbate underlying socioeconomic 
inequalities.30 Instead of transitions to democratic 
forms of rule, the immediate aftermath of civil 
conflict tends to offer opportunities for further 
concentrations of power as moderates are 
marginalized and violent, oppressive groups take 
advantage of temporary power vacuums.31
On its face, peacebuilding tends to be directly 
opposed to authoritarianism, focused instead 
on inclusive forms of governance, free 
elections, and power-sharing arrangements. 
UN peacebuilding interventions typically include 
electoral assistance, capacity-building for State 
institutions, civic education, mediation focused 
on bringing political parties together, and other 
efforts broadly emphasizing democratization.32 
As von Billerbeck and Tansey point out, 
peacebuilding “rests on a set of overtly normative 
foundations related to institutional reform and 
the desirability of democracy.”33
However, the success of UN peacebuilding to date 
is at best mixed, especially in terms of its goal of 
improving democratic processes and reducing 
authoritarian forms of rule. Some scholarship 
has found that democratization tends to improve 
in settings where a UN peacebuilding mission is 
deployed,34 whereas others are more sceptical 
about the direct causal impact of peacebuilding 
on democratization.35 Indeed, a growing body of 
literature has highlighted the potential negative 
side effects of international peacebuilding, 
including the tendency for international 
interventions to strengthen elite concentrations 
of power, especially where leaders promise 
democratic reforms without delivering.36 In a 
direct critique of peacebuilding, Richard Gowan 
has noted: “The UN, having aspired to instil 
democracy and good governance in countries 
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like the DRC and South Sudan, has ended up 
propping up unreliable and even autocratic 
leaders in the absence of better alternatives.”37
Scholarship to date, however, has not 
investigated this unintended consequence of 
peacebuilding empirically, instead focusing 
almost exclusively on the positive links between 
peacebuilding and democratization. For example, 
authors like Fortna and Huang explicitly examine 
the extent to which peace operations lead to 
greater democratization, without investigating 
the potential converse: their contribution to 
concentrations of authority in an elite.38 The 
result is that authoritarianism is considered 
as the absence of democratization and/or the 
lack of good governance, rather than a set of 
mechanisms that enable leaders to maintain 
concentrated and illiberal forms of power. 
This has led to an artificial separation between 
the literatures on peacebuilding and studies 
of authoritarianism, despite the clear value in 
examining the issues together. The present 
project aims to fill that gap in understanding 
of the links between peacebuilding and 
authoritarianism.
Two ways peacebuilding 
enables authoritarianism
Peacebuilding may unintentionally enable 
authoritarianism in two related ways: (1) by 
providing material support to governments in 
ways that strengthen centralized regimes, and 
(2) by sending political signals to leaderships 
about the costs of authoritarian behaviour.39 
In some cases, one form of support may take 
place without the other, but most often the 
two operate together to, directly and indirectly, 
enable authoritarian leadership.
Material support to host governments is often 
the stated goal of peacebuilding. Indeed, UN 
interventions most typically take the form of 
capacity-building to State institutions like the 
judiciary, security services, and electoral bodies, 
or technical/advisory support to governance 
institutions.40 While such capacity-building aims 
to promote inclusive forms of governance, it can 
contribute to more authoritarian tendencies 
if the elite is able to co-opt and manipulate 
the assistance in pursuit of repressive and/
or exclusionary policies.41 The elite are often 
in a good position to control the distribution 
of international support by influencing the 
administration of funding, constraining the 
distribution of resources, and using State 
institutions as instruments of coercion rather 
than civilian protection. In the case of UN 
peacekeeping, this tendency may be even 
stronger, as UN peacekeepers tend to operate 
jointly with host government security services, 
providing a military boost and logistical support 
to the State.
International peacebuilders are not ignorant 
of these risks, but are placed in a dilemma, 
needing to achieve their overarching goal of 
strengthening governance capacities in fragile 
settings while also promoting open, transparent 
State institutions. The UN, as a fundamentally 
State-centric organization, has thus far tended 
to resolve this dilemma in favour of the State, 
following top-down approaches that tend 
to strengthen elites even while aiming to 
promote equitable access to resources across 
societies.42 One reason for this may be that 
UN field presences are expected to deliver 
on programmatic goals – such as improved 
institutional capacities, short-term stability, 
reduction of fighting – and may find themselves 
needing to prioritize activities that will deliver 
measurable outputs in favour of broader 
objectives such as improved transparency and 
more inclusive forms of governance.
Secondly, UN peacebuilders may send explicit 
or implicit signals to the political leadership 
of a country about the costs of authoritarian 
behaviour. One of the most common examples 
is election fraud and/or repressive tactics around 
election cycles. Here, international actors 
may play a key role in shaping the behaviour 
of political elites, leveraging the threat of 
international condemnation or refusing to 
recognize an outcome that does not meet widely 
agreed standards. As incumbent regimes weigh 
the risks of political repression or outright vote 
manipulation, peacebuilders can play a vital 
role in providing information about the likely 
response by the international community, 
including the risks that may arise if elections are 
not free and fair. 
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Research has shown that some external signals 
of support can enable authoritarian outcomes 
by bolstering the perceived strength of the 
incumbent regime and minimizing the perceived 
costs of repressive tactics.43 If, for example, it is 
clear that international development support 
will continue even in the face of relatively high 
levels of political repression, or if major powers 
demonstrate over time that their peacebuilding 
support is not conditional on open democratic 
processes, incumbents may be emboldened to 
cling on to power via authoritarian techniques. 
Given that peacebuilders must often prioritize 
their ability to access the host country (e.g. by 
not taking public lines that might have them 
expelled, or by pursuing weak forms of advocacy 
to ensure continued access to powerbrokers), the 
signals to ruling regimes can often be an implicit 
condonation of repression.44 The UN, bound by 
the principle of host State consent, is especially 
susceptible to this form of acquiescence, 
especially when faced with strong pressures to 
deliver programmatic outcomes in partnership 
with host governments. These forms of tacit 
toleration and silence in the face of human rights 
abuses may lower the perceived repercussions 
of authoritarian behaviour and embolden 
repressive regimes.
Methodology and case selection
The core hypothesis behind this project is 
that peacebuilding support may inadvertently 
contribute to greater centralization of resources 
and power in a small elite, combining with 
political signalling to enable authoritarian 
tendencies in governance. Conversely, where 
resources are well distributed across a range 
of stakeholders (especially those representing 
marginalized groups) and where the signalling 
clearly articulates the costs of autocratic 
behaviour, interventions may contribute to less 
authoritarian outcomes. Of course, international 
actors are rarely in a position to determine 
regime types or transitional outcomes and 
should be humble about the results they can 
achieve. But in general, there are ways in which 
the UN and its partners can tilt the playing field in 
ways that can be consequential to citizens.
To test this claim, the authors chose case 
studies where the international peacebuilding 
investment was significant, and where the 
UN’s contribution constituted a relatively large 
share of the overall investment. These cases 
are thus “most likely crucial” examples of the 
authors’ hypothesis, where the explanatory 
variable is more likely to influence the outcome. 
In simple terms, countries with comparatively 
large peacebuilding interventions are more 
likely to be influenced by those interventions. 
This does not mean that peacebuilding can be 
isolated as the sole cause of authoritarianism 
– indeed the UN is often a very small player in 
the overall peacebuilding donor landscape, and 
national governments may rely very little on 
international peacebuilding support to finance 
State-led activities – but it offers a stronger basis 
for suggesting that UN engagement plays a role.
Here, the investments of the Secretary-General’s 
PBF offer one proxy for UN investments in 
peacebuilding more broadly. Though the 
PBF is not the only source of UN funding for 
peacebuilding, its stated aim of catalyzing larger 
investments provides a general indication of 
the UN’s overall investment in peacebuilding in 
a given country setting. And by comparing the 
UN’s investments as a portion of the overall 
international investment by bilateral and 
multilateral actors, cases can be selected where 
the UN contribution is relatively high. The authors 
also selected cases where the peacebuilding 
investment is significant when compared 
to overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
eliminating those cases where peacebuilding is 
dwarfed by other sources of revenue. In cases 
where a large multi-dimensional peacekeeping 
mission was present, the authors also considered 
its possible role in supporting peacebuilding, 
especially where international peacebuilding 
support was significantly channelled through 
the UN.
A crucial distinction concerns where international 
peacebuilding investments flow: the authors 
assume that investments distributed directly 
to the State are more likely to result in 
concentrations of power than those that are 
distributed to other actors, such as civil society, 
NGOs, or international NGOs (INGOs). By using 
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the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), development flows related 
to peacebuilding can be disaggregated and 
quantified. Following the methodology adopted 
by the PBSO,45 four separate categories of CRS 
Purpose Codes related peacebuilding support 
can be clustered as: (a) political processes; (b) 
basic safety and security; (c) rule of law and 
human rights; and (d) core government functions. 
Of these four categories, the final category on 
core government functions (CGF) is the most 
likely to demonstrate a causal relationship 
between peacebuilding and authoritarianism, 
given that resources are most frequently flowing 
directly to the government (or through a UN 
agency to support a government capacity). In 
contrast, countries receiving relatively fewer 
resources to CGF and a greater share of financial 
flows to inclusive political processes should be 
more likely to result in less concentration in a 
small elite.
As such, the cases reflect the following criteria, to 
ensure that the cases being captured are where 
peacebuilding contribution to State capacity are 
most likely to be seen:
1. 10 years46 of PBF investments that constitute a 
significant share of the overall peacebuilding 
portfolio in-country. 
2. 10 years of international peacebuilding 
investments that are significantly directed 
towards CGF.
3. 10 years of PBF investments that constitute a 
significant share of the country’s cumulative 
GDP. 
Of course, the UN’s PBF is only one source of 
peacebuilding support, and the authors also 
took into account overall Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) peacebuilding assistance, 
examining where international support 
constituted a significant share of a country’s GDP. 
And in settings with UN peace operations, the 
authors also accounted for the role of the mission 
in both providing material support and acting as a 
strong signalling instrument for the international 
community.
On this basis, and in addition to the three in-
depth cases (the DRC, Haiti, and Cambodia), the 
authors selected the following cases: Burundi, 
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in Polity V 
Score
Madagascar $ 8 2.0% 95% 0.006% 0.3% 26 -5 6
Comoros $ 12 16.5% 74% 0.104% 0.467% -11 -2 -12
Cote D'Ivoire $ 36 4.9% 64% 0.01% 0.13% 17 -5 4
Sierra Leone $ 37 6.1% 61% 0.099% 0.999% -5 11 0
Guinea $ 62 13.9% 58% 0.064% 0.27% 1 10 5
Guinea-Bissau $ 17 11.0% 47% 0.152% 0.655% 16 0 0
Burundi $ 45 6.0% 47% 0.174% 1.343% -21 1 -7
Kyrgyzstan $ 33 5.8% 36% 0.05% 0.309% 0 12 7
Somalia $ 26 1.3% 29% - - 5 1 5
Data source: UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office and OECD.Stat
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d’Ivoire, Guinea, Somalia, and Kyrgyzstan for 
further analysis. Within this universe of cases, two 
groups can be distinguished: (a) in Comoros, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone, where between 
58-74 per cent of the ten-year international 
peacebuilding portfolio was distributed to CGF, 
whereas (b) Kyrgyzstan and Somalia see less than 
35 per cent of international assistance allocated 
to CGF. In addition, in Somalia, 34 per cent of all 
bilateral peacebuilding support is channelled 
through UN agencies – making it a unique case of 
UN peacebuilding, having a larger contribution to 
State capacity vis-à-vis other actors. This variation 
among cases allows for some comparison 
between cases having more or less tendency 
towards centralization.
Finally, the authors tracked the levels of 
authoritarianism using widely accepted 
metrics, including the Freedom House rankings, 
Transparency International and the Polity IV index 
(see above diagram). While not definitive, these 
tracking mechanisms allow for some indication 
of whether countries’ levels of authoritarianism 
are increasing or decreasing during a ten-year 
period of peacebuilding support. One of the 
more striking findings from this research is 
that some settings with the most intensive 
peacebuilding support to CGF have had little to 
no improvements in governance scores and have, 
in fact, worsened (e.g. Burundi and Comoros). 
In some cases, such as Kyrgyzstan and Somalia, 
there were small improvements in governance 
indicators, though in those cases there was 
relatively little support to CGF (and, in the case of 
Somalia, a high rate of funding via UN agencies). 
These findings broadly support the authors’ 
hypothesis that support to CGF may contribute 
to greater centralization of resources and a 
possible increase in authoritarian tendencies. 
Here, attribution is especially difficult, given 
the many factors influencing authoritarian 
tendencies in governance, but the authors adopt 
an approach now used by the UN Department 
of Political Affairs (DPPA) and others to describe 
the UN’s contribution (alongside other actors) to 
change.47 To be clear, the authors are making no 
claims that peacebuilding support is the only or 
even principal cause of authoritarian outcomes, 
only that certain kinds of programming and 
signalling may contribute – alongside a range 
of other factors – to authoritarian tendencies in 
different settings.
One of the more striking findings 
from this research is that some 
settings with the most intensive 
peacebuilding support to core 
government functions have had little 
to no improvements in governance 
scores and have, in fact, worsened. 
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This section employs the two-part causal 
mechanism for enabling – material support and 
signalling – and draws from the case studies 
to explore the ways in which peacebuilding 
support may feed or combat authoritarian 
tendencies. It attempts to identify key moments 
and factors that may influence how and whether 
peacebuilding support results in its intended 
outcome of more inclusive, sustainable peace 
processes. 
1. The gravitational pull of  
the State
International peacebuilding often channels funds 
or capacities directly to the State, even where 
its primary goal is to support inclusive political 
processes and broad-based approaches to peace. 
One proxy for this is the extent to which ODA 
related to peacebuilding assistance is directed 
towards CGF versus other activities like inclusive 
political processes or human rights. Activities in 
support of CGF are not only assumed to support 
the capacity of the State but are – more often 
than other types of peacebuilding – channelled 
directly through the recipient government. 
Across a number of cases, the bulk of ODA 
to peacebuilding was directed to CGF, with 
comparatively less money going to UN agencies, 
civil society groups, or other organizations.48 
At the high end of the spectrum, countries 
like Madagascar and Comoros have well over 
70 per cent of their peacebuilding funding 
directed at CGF, while more than 50 per cent 
is channelled directly through the government 
itself. Moreover, the authors tracked a tendency 
for the proportion of funding allocated to the 
State to increase over time. This is logical: as 
government capacities increase, their ability 
to absorb and spend resources also grows. 
However, this can contribute to a concentration 
of resources in the political elite, given their 
control of major institutional spending. In Guinea-
Bissau, for example, roughly 13 per cent of ODA 
disbursements related to peacebuilding were 
channelled directly to the government in 2008, a 
number that had climbed to nearly 50 per cent by 
2018. Similarly in Guinea, over the past ten years 
the proportion of ODA peacebuilding funding that 
has gone directly to the Guinean government has 
increased significantly, from roughly 8 per cent 
in 2008 to more than 40 per cent by 2018. This 
reflects the significant investment in SSR, but also 
large investments in public sector administration 
and institutional capacity-building. Overall, these 
numbers reflect a strong gravitational pull of 
the State as a recipient of ODA peacebuilding 
funding, particularly when they become eligible 
for grants and loans from IFIs.
However, peacebuilding funding also can be 
shifted away from the State in response to 
authoritarian tendencies, as was the case in Côte 
d’Ivoire’s 2010-12 elections crisis. Beginning in 
2010, international peacebuilding support was 
very much focused on support to the State in 
terms of public finance management, with 
nearly USD 95 million spent on CGF versus only 
USD 36 million on inclusive political processes. 
Immediately following the electoral crisis, 
however, this ratio changed dramatically: in 
2012, spending on CGF had shrunk to well 
under USD 10 million, with only 12 per cent 
of international funds going to the Ivorian 
Government. In financial terms, this reflects a 
penalty being placed on the Ivorian Government 
A Comparison Across 
Peacebuilding Settings 
11
Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Peacebuilding ODA - Comoros
Inclusive Political Processes
























Top 5 UN Channels for ODA 
Legal and judicial development
Human rights
Ending violence against women and girls
Security system management and reform
Anti-corruption organizations and institutions
Civilian peacebuilding, conflict 
prevention and resolution
Democratic participation and civil society
Women's rights organizations and 
movements and government institutions
Public sector policy and administrative management
Public finance management
Decentralization and support 
to subnational government
Domestic revenue mobilization
Figure 1 – ODA to Peacebuilding in Comoros, 2019: 49 per cent channeled through  
the government
Channel Name Disbursement in (USD M)
UN Development Programme 13
UNICEF 4
ILO - Accessed contributions 1
ILO - Regular budget  
supplementary account 0
UN Industrial Development 
Organization 0
Data source: OECD.Stat.
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and it coincided with the imposition of targeted 
sanctions by many Member States and some 
regional organizations. By 2018 (see Figure 2) 
and reflecting the relative return of international 
support to Outtara’s Government, roughly 37 per 
cent of international peacebuilding funds were 
directed to the Ivorian Government, and there 
was more or less parity between the funds going 
to CGF and inclusive political processes.
Here, it is worth noting that the PBF (unlike other 
international donors) allocates mainly through 
UN agencies and civil society organizations 
– making its direct material contributions to 
the government negligible. At the same time, 
analysing the PBF portfolio over a five-year period 
reveals that the PBF is much more focused on 
Inclusive Political Processes than other types of 
peacebuilding by international donors. In fact, 
there are only a few cases where PBF supported 
CGF at all.49 In Burundi, for example, the PBF’s 
stated goals are to strengthen the governance 
capacities of the State, help to reintegrate militias, 
support human rights processes, and brokering 
inclusive forms of political dialogue. Its principal 
areas of its investment are the rule of law, SSR, 
and reconciliation/social cohesion. 47 per cent 
of its funds are directed towards CGF and are 
thus likely to contribute to State capacity in 
authoritarian settings.50 This investment (USD 
80 million of investments since 2007) constitutes 
a substantial portion of overall international 
Figure 2 – ODA to Peacebuilding in Côte d’Ivoire, 2018
Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Peacebuilding ODA - Cote d'Ivoire
Inclusive Political Processes













Legal and judicial development
Human rights
Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular 
and responsible migration and mobility
Ending violence against women and girls
Civilian peacebuilding, conflict 
prevention and resolution
Democratic participation and civil society
Women's rights organizations and 
movements and government institutions
Legislatures and political parties
Public finance management
Domestic revenue mobilization
Public sector policy and administrative management
Decentralization and support 
to subnational government
0.14Security system management and reform
0.1Participation in international peacekeeping operations
Anti-corruption organizations and institutions 0.19
Data source: OECD.Stat.
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Top 5 UN Channels for ODA 
Human rights
Legal and judicial development
Security system management and reform
Participation in international peacekeeping operations
Civilian peacebuilding, conflict 
prevention and resolution
Democratic participation and civil society
Women's rights organizations and 
movements and government institutions
Media and free flow of information
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Figure 3 – ODA to Peacebuilding in Burundi, 2016-18
Channel Name Disbursement in (USD M)
UN High Commissioner  
for Refugees 385
World Food Programme 117
UNICEF 92
UN Development Programme 49
Food and Agriculture Organization 18
Data source: OECD.Stat.
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support to CGF (roughly 13 per cent), reflecting 
more than 6 per cent of all foreign investment 
in the country, and is also one of the highest 
investments relative to the country’s GDP (nearly 
2 per cent), highlighting Burundi as a critical case 
in which substantial international funds have 
passed to State-owned enterprises.51
However, the PBF in Burundi has also directly 
attempted to support inclusive political 
processes, potentially offsetting the emphasis 
on other government functions by its support 
to elections, including during the 2015 crisis, 
reflecting a greater focus on inclusion over time. 
In February 2015, the PBF approved a USD 1.24 
million project to support political dialogue in 
Burundi to facilitate a peaceful pre-electoral and 
post-electoral climate.52 However, unlike several 
other country settings (see, e.g., the DRC case 
study), material support from the UN for the State 
to administer elections was relatively limited.53 
In 2015, the UN sent an elections observation 
mission (MENUB), which provided some limited 
logistical support to the electoral commission, 
but the bulk of the process was funded by the 
Government.54 In fact, in both the 2015 and 2020 
elections, the Burundian authorities collected 
funds directly from citizens to support elections, 
in large part to avoid external pressures by 
large donors.55 On the one hand, this limitation 
on support may avoid capture by the State, but 
it also meant that the Burundian Government 
was able to control its election process with 
little oversight by the international community, 
potentially encouraging more repressive actions 
by the State.
Overall, the cases underscore the strong 
gravitational pull of the State when it comes to 
peacebuilding support by international donors. 
Across the cases (though with some exceptions) 
the proportion of funding directed towards the 
State tends to increase over time, even when 
countries exhibit worrying trends towards more 
authoritarian, repressive forms of rule. Here, 
the UN’s tendency to channel support through 
non-government agencies, and its relative 
emphasis on inclusive political processes, may 
act as a counterbalance to the broader trends of 
State capture.
2. Overriding focus on the 
executive 
While ostensibly supporting inclusive political 
processes at every level, in practice UN 
peacebuilding support has a strong tendency 
to focus on the executive, particularly around 
transitions in leadership. In Haiti, for example, 
the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
insisted upon a recount of the presidential 
elections following reports of irregularities in 
the 2006 elections, but made no such request of 
parliamentary electoral vote despite the same 
concerns of fraud. This focus on support to the 
executive continued after the election, enabling 
the presidency to manipulate the electoral 
commission process and delay the appointment 
of new parliamentarians between 2014 and 
2016. As the case study in this report lay out, 
the privileging of the executive inadvertently 
emboldened authoritarian tendencies by: (1) 
pushing for constitutional reforms that bolstered 
the presidency at the expense of parliament and 
local government; (2) treating the presidency 
as the guarantor of Haiti’s stability; and (3) 
paying less attention to the building of electoral 
institutions and decentralization that might have 
acted as a check on the executive.
Even more visible was the UN Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC)’s overriding focus on the presidency 
in the context of the 2006 elections in the DRC, 
where the UN and its partners supported 
a process that gave substantial powers to 
the executive, despite clear indications that 
institutions beyond the executive were crucial for 
peace (see case studies). As the Under-Secretary-
General of Peacekeeping at the time, Jean-
Marie Guéhenno, reflected: “At enormous and 
unsustainable cost, the international community 
consolidated the presidency through elections 
and largely ignored the other institutions of the 
State.”56 Here, the assumption appeared to be 
that a strong presidency was the most viable 
pathway to short-term stability, though little 
thought appeared to have gone into how that 
might lead to authoritarian forms of rule in the 
long term.
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On one hand, this focus on the executive is 
logical: in moments of transition a strong, 
effective executive is crucial for guaranteeing 
stability and delivering on much-needed 
national reforms. Especially in the aftermath 
of conflict, the executive can provide a rallying 
point around which fragmented groups can 
cohere into an elite bargain, and often it is the 
most important interlocutor for the UN and 
major donors. However, the executive is also 
the branch that most readily slides towards 
authoritarianism, sometimes co-opting legislative 
and judicial branches of government in moments 
of transition, and often acting to marginalize 
political opposition to secure its role at the centre. 
The tendency for peacebuilding to focus on the 
executive branch can unintentionally bolster 
these trends. 
3. Support to the security 
services 
Similar to its focus on the executive, the UN’s 
support to the State security services – most often 
the military but also the police – offers another 
pathway to enabling authoritarianism. This can 
take the form of material support (training, 
logistical support, joint operations, resources) 
or a more general empowering of the central elite 
that allows it to maintain a grip on power. 
A prime example of this dynamic is MONUC/
MONUSCO in the DRC, where the UN mission has 
provided significant support to the State security 
services over a 20-year period (see case studies). 
Here, the UN mission has regularly assisted the 
national army with training, logistical support, 
joint patrols, and direct firepower against the 
armed groups in eastern Congo.57 The 2013 
establishment of the UN Force Intervention 
Brigade provided a 3,000-strong unit, which 
has provided robust support in the form of 
long-range artillery, special forces, and drones 
to support Congolese ground operations. 
This support, overtly aimed at extending State 
authority and building State capacity to govern, 
also boosted the coercive capacity of security 
services that were also responsible for large-scale 
repression, violence, and human rights violations, 
including against the political opposition of 
President Kabila at the time.58 While steps like the 
UN’s human rights due diligence policy worked 
against some of these risks, the DRC case study 
below suggests that the overall impact was 
to bolster the authoritarian tendencies of the 
Kabila Government, including by aligning the UN 
with an army that was increasingly viewed as an 
extension of Kabila’s repressive State apparatus. 
One UN expert suggested that the UN’s support 
helped turn the army into “President Kabila’s own 
private military company.”59
While the DRC case offers the starkest example 
of the unintended effects of military support, it is 
worth noting that other forms of peacebuilding 
support may play into a similar dynamic. In 
particular, peacebuilding programming with 
strong SSR components, such as the 2012-2016 
Second Peacebuilding Priority Plan agreed 
between the UN Peacebuilding Commission 
(PBC) and the Government of Guinea, required 
a significant investment in the State’s security 
services.60 The peacebuilding framework adopted 
for Guinea-Bissau in 2008 similarly emphasized 
the investment in SSR, contributing to the 
tendency of international peacebuilding to be 
channelled to the State.61
4. Preventing overthrow 
The threat of coups can at times induce political 
leaders to cooperate with rival elites or make 
concessions to the wider public, especially if there 
is strong pressure from large constituencies. 
The presence of a UN mission – especially one 
with a use of force mandate – can provide 
overt and implicit protection to those leaders, 
reducing their willingness to reach out to other 
actors.62 While ostensibly working to promote 
stability and prevent violent overthrows, the 
UN’s protection of political leaders can have the 
unintended consequence of emboldening them 
and increasing their authoritarian tendencies.
Haiti offers an example of this dynamic, including 
during Michel Martelly’s presidency following the 
2010 earthquake. Martelly oversaw some of the 
worst democratic backsliding in recent history 
in Haiti, during which time he ruled exclusively 
by decree and oversaw a shambolic elections 
process that resulted in the appointment of 
Martelly’s hand-picked successor (see Haiti case 
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study). Despite rapidly falling popularity, Martelly 
bragged that he could not be forcibly removed 
because MINUSTAH’s presence rendered him 
“safe from coups.”63 A similar dynamic arose 
regarding President Préval who “did not have 
any incentive to be responsive to the fragmented 
population” while MINUSTAH was present and 
supporting the State.64
Protection of the executive from military 
overthrow can take many forms, from the fairly 
obvious presence of international troops in-
country to the more subtle signalling the UN may 
offer (e.g. joint programming, public statements 
in support of the government). And while the 
UN may have strong incentives to prevent 
highly disruptive events like military coups, one 
outcome may be that a deeply entrenched leader 
has fewer incentives to accommodate a broader 
constituency while the UN remains engaged. 
Here, the risks are especially high where UN 
peace operations are deployed, but also exist in 
other peacebuilding settings where the need to 
collaborate with a small elite at the centre can be 
instrumentalized to thwart more inclusive forms 
of rule. 
5. The dark side of  “national 
ownership” 
Peacebuilding is founded upon the principle 
of national ownership and aims to build buy-
in from national and local authorities, and it is 
increasingly also seen as a way to empower local 
civil society groups as a way to more equitably 
distribute power in fragile settings. In principle, 
this should lead to jointly-agreed programmes 
and a gradual increase in the capacities of the 
host country to govern effectively, and with 
greater legitimacy with the broader population. 
In practice, turning responsibility over to already 
isolated repressive governments can send a 
message that they may act as they wish, enabling 
authoritarian tendencies in some settings. 
Burundi offers one such example. Following 
the 2015 electoral violence, a UN Commission 
of Inquiry found grounds to believe that crimes 
against humanity had been perpetrated by 
the Burundian State, including acts of violence 
and repression against political opposition 
parties. When the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) subsequently opened an investigation 
into Burundi, President Nkurunziza promptly 
withdrew from the court, rejecting the claims 
as a form of neo-colonialism and calling for 
a drawdown of UN presence in-country.65 
This withdrawal from the international arena 
continued towards the 2020 elections, when the 
Government sent collectors out to communities 
to levy a tax that would pay for elections, avoiding 
any reliance on outside support and ensuring 
that the process could be internally controlled. 
With little leverage and few entry points, the UN’s 
messaging fell back on the well-worn phrase of 
national ownership; for example, the Secretary-
General announced in 2018: “it is ultimately 
the responsibility of the authorities to create a 
conducive environment in which the country can 
fulfil its potential and the people of Burundi enjoy 
their rights and freedoms, including participation 
in credible and inclusive elections.”66 While 
explicitly calling for a credible process, the UN’s 
resort to national responsibility also appeared 
to send an implicit message that the penalties 
for fraudulent or repressive elections would be 
de minimis. 
Cambodia offers another such example. Faced 
with widespread reports of repression and abuse 
during the 1993 elections, the UN Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) proposed 
that the Cambodian court system take on 
responsibility for trying the perpetrators, the 
majority of whom were part of the ruling elite 
party. This notion that the national judiciary 
should own the accountability process, however, 
failed to account for the fact that Cambodia’s 
justice system was underdeveloped and largely 
beholden to the ruling party. Unsurprisingly, 
the cases referred to the Cambodian courts by 
UNTAC were quickly dismissed or indefinitely 
postponed, meaning the UN’s strong messaging 
on accountability were largely ignored (see 
Cambodia case study). 
As noted in the expert roundtable held during this 
project, problematic tendencies within the State 
do not necessarily mean that the UN should pivot 
uncritically to civil society groups as a panacea 
to the challenges of corruption and elite control 
of power. Indeed, in many settings civil society 
groups may suffer from the same shortcomings 
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of mismanagement of funds, elite manipulation 
of resources, and exclusion of much of society. 
Instead, research for this project suggests that 
policies of national and/or local ownership may 
unintentionally enable authoritarian tendencies 
unless they are accompanied with a clear 
understanding of the risks and safeguards to 
prevent them. 
6. Rhetoric, with and without 
teeth
When key international players and regional 
organizations are able to unite around common 
messaging holding leaders accountable – and 
indeed where those messages are backed up with 
tangible actions such as sanctions – the ability to 
constrain authoritarian behaviour is maximized. 
This was the case in Guinea-Bissau following the 
2012 coup and subsequent political crisis, where 
the UN, European Union (EU), African Union 
(AU) and major powers aligned in support of the 
Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)’s mediation efforts and backed up 
their messaging with a strong sanctions regime.67 
The result was a relatively rapid agreement 
amongst the parties to a transition and power-
sharing arrangement designed to provide a more 
inclusive basis for the subsequent elections.
In contrast, where the messaging is mixed or 
inconsistent, authoritarian tendencies may be 
reinforced, in part because of the ability of the 
leadership to forum shop. The 2018 crisis in 
Comoros offers one such example: In the context 
of a referendum that would extend the rule of the 
incumbent and overturn a long-standing power-
sharing agreement, in July 2018 the UN Secretary-
General expressed concern over “persisting 
restrictions of civil liberties and democratic 
rights” during the referendum.68 This echoed 
the AU’s statement on the need for an inclusive 
and transparent referendum and elections in 
2018 and 2019.69 In contrast, the South African 
Development Community (SADC) welcomed 
Comoros to its membership in the midst of the 
crisis around the referendum, sending a signal 
that Comoros would now be part of the most 
influential regional grouping (interestingly, 
this came on the heels of SADC’s decision to 
exclude Burundi following Nkurunziza’s third-
term bid).70 In fact, despite widespread reports 
of voting irregularities in the 2019 election, 
SADC welcomed the outcome, stressing that 
they had been peaceful.71 This inconsistency in 
messaging meant that the Comorian leadership 
could essentially forum shop amongst regional 
entities, thus dramatically reducing the impact of 
the public positions of the AU and UN. 
Across the cases, regional actors and immediate 
neighbours played an outsized role in influencing 
the domestic trajectories of peace processes, 
including in Guinea-Bissau, the DRC, Somalia, 
and Kyrgyzstan. Here, the concepts of linkage 
and diffusion are especially important (see 
Section I above). Where neighbours are part 
of a concerted, unified strategy in support 
of an inclusive process (such as ECOWAS’ 
role in Guinea-Bissau), the checks on more 
repressive outcomes are maximized. Where the 
neighbourhood is fragmented and not aligned 
with international messaging (such as the role of 
regional actors in Somalia, or the above Comoros 
example), the risks of spoilers and so-called “black 
knights” supporting authoritarian outcomes is 
heightened.72 This does not preclude the use of 
“good and bad cops,” where the UN might deliver 
harder or softer messages than other actors, but 
it does point to the need for a coherent, strategic 
approach across the international community.
7. The hostage of electoral 
support 
One of the most important entry points for the 
UN and international partners in authoritarian 
settings is electoral support, given that elections 
are often considered the best opportunity to 
transition from deeply entrenched forms of 
rule. Providing technical and advisory support to 
elections can position the UN well to positively 
influence the process, and to call attention 
to the kinds of repression and manipulation 
that might take place in autocratic settings. 
Conversely, the UN’s need to maintain good 
relations with the political leadership, the 
fact that UN electoral support is based upon 
a request by the government (which can be 
withdrawn at any time), the built-in eagerness 
to demonstrate success in electoral support via 
credible outcomes, and the UN’s tendency to 
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privilege stability over other goals all combine to 
make electoral support a fraught and potentially 
risky endeavour in terms of reducing the risks of 
authoritarianism.
The DRC offers several examples of the 
problematic aspects of UN support to elections, in 
particular the ways in which it may unintentionally 
advantage an increasingly authoritarian 
incumbent. In 2006, UN support to the Congolese 
electoral process took place at a time when the 
UN had established strong and positive relations 
with Joseph Kabila in the context of the peace 
process. This public relationship, according 
to one expert, “gave him a very good head 
start”73 in the elections, while the UN’s weaker 
relationship with the main opposition figure 
(Jean-Pierre Bemba) was far less advantageous 
to him. As an expert noted: “Kabila owe[d] his 
victory in no small part to…the longstanding 
support that he received from the international 
community,” including MONUC.74 Indeed, when 
the State employed various repressive tactics in 
the lead up to the elections (e.g. the murder of 
a journalist who had been critical of the State, 
which was widely reported to have been carried 
out by the stated security services), the UN only 
issued a broad condemnation and called on all 
sides to cooperate.75 This pattern continued 
during the 2011 presidential elections, where 
Kabila’s increasingly authoritarian behaviour 
– e.g. an amendment to the constitution that 
clearly benefited the incumbent, and violent 
repressive tactics by the security services – was 
met with little public resistance from the UN. In 
fact, the UN continued its support to the State 
throughout this period and, in fact, hailed “the 
positive cooperation between MONUSCO and 
DRC military and civilian justice authorities.” 
Subsequently, when the elections were 
widely declared as fraudulent by independent 
observers, the UN again stuck to mild criticism 
and maintained its interaction with Kabila much 
as it had been.76 As one UN official put it, the 
mission wanted “to continue business as usual.”77
A similar example can be found in the Cambodia 
case study, where UNTAC’s deep investment in 
the electoral process contributed to a relatively 
passive UN response to the ruling party’s clear 
repressive tactics in 1993 (see Cambodia case 
study). Discussions within UNTAC at the time 
– which exposed a divide between the more 
pragmatic camp focused on good relations 
with the Government and a more human 
rights-focused camp demanding that issues 
of repression generate a strong response – 
underscored the extent to which UN electoral 
support tends to align with host government 
prerogatives. The result was a series of fairly 
mild statements by the UN at a time when 
the repression of the political opposition was 
growing impossible to ignore, sending a signal to 
the ruling elite that the costs of authoritarianism 
were relatively low.
© UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran
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The immediate post-electoral period can also 
present risks for the UN to inadvertently enable 
authoritarianism, as evidenced by the Guinea 
elections in 2010. After a hotly contested run-off 
election where both parties alleged widespread 
fraud, the Guinean Supreme Court issued a ruling 
in favour of Alpha Condé, ushering in a period 
of international approval, a resumption of more 
positive diplomatic relations, and a sense that 
the donor community had a viable partner in the 
State.78 However, President Condé soon began 
reneging on many of the core commitments of 
the peace agreement that had preceded the 
elections, resisting more inclusive forms of rule 
and overtly arrogating power to the executive 
branch. Two years after the election, and in 
violation of the peace agreement, no national 
assembly had been formed, while the newly 
established Independent National Electoral 
Commission became stalled around issues of 
voter registration. And while the UN’s regional 
envoy – Mohamed Ibn Chambas – warned of 
“dangerous cleavage” as a result of the failure 
of the peace process to meaningfully include 
opposition and marginalized groups, Condé faced 
few serious repercussions for failures to meet 
the commitments of the Ouagadougou process. 
When, in 2015, Condé won a second term amidst 
widespread reports of fraud and intimidation 
of the political opposition, the UN’s message 
was a muted one about avoiding a return to 
violence.79 The result was that the post-electoral 
honeymoon period for Condé appeared to give 
him ample opportunity to centralize power, 
withdraw from commitments to more inclusive 
forms of rule, and resume normal relations with 
donors without facing serious repercussions.
Ultimately, these cases demonstrate that even 
situations of serious electoral misconduct 
seldom result in more than a public slap on the 
wrist or public condemnation, almost never 
triggering the kinds of withdrawal of support 
or shift in position that might actually change 
behaviour. This can be explained in part by the 
UN’s prerogative to maintain positive relations 
with the host government and to avoid rocking 
boats during moments of political instability, but 
an unintended outcome in some instances has 
been an emboldening of repressive actors.
8. Security Council mandates – 
a double-edged sword
On the one hand, settings in which the Security 
Council has issued a mandate and deployed a 
peace operation have a significant advantage 
in combatting authoritarian tendencies in 
peacebuilding. The attention of the Council may 
act as a spotlight on repressive behaviour, while 
often operations will have significant resources 
to gather information, monitor human rights 
violations, and even at times support democratic 
processes. This was the case in the three case 
studies of Haiti, Cambodia and the DRC, where 
in each the UN had a specific mandate related 
to supporting democratic transformation, 
credible elections, and protecting political space 
(see case studies). In contrast, settings without 
a peace operation may more easily fall below 
the international community’s radar, providing 
the UN with less leverage to push back on 
domineering governments. The 2018 reform 
process, which ostensibly creates a more political 
role for UN Resident Coordinators across the UN 
system, has done little thus far to equip non-
mission settings with more capacities or leverage 
to counter authoritarian regimes.
However, the mandates of peace operations 
also may constrain the UN’s ability to resist 
authoritarian pushes by governments and may 
indeed position the UN even more as a service 
provider for the State. This is particularly the 
case where the UN operation is mandated to 
support a peace agreement that prioritizes SSR, 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR), or other activities that necessarily involve 
substantial support to the State. MONUC/
MONUSCO, for example, has fairly consistently 
been mandated to support the State’s SSR, DDR, 
and stabilization activities, the latter of which 
has involved large-scale State-led institutional 
development with UN funding. In fact, across 
a wide range of peace operations, there is a 
strong tendency for the mandates to prioritize 
the State, whether through capacity-building to 
State institutions, support to national reforms, 
or programmatic support to State-run projects.80 
Where the UN is mandated to use force, these 
tendencies are even stronger, given the UN’s 
partnership with national security services (joint 
patrols, joint operations, etc.). 
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Figure 4 – ODA to Peacebuilding in Guinea Bissau, 2008-2018
Channel Name Disbursement in (USD M)
UN Development Programme 71
World Food Programme 37
UNICEF 35
UN agency, fund or commission 8
UN Population Fund 5
Data source: OECD.Stat.
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In fact, even peacebuilding missions that do 
not have use of force mandates are susceptible 
to this tendency, such as in Guinea-Bissau. In 
2008, the PBC adopted a Strategic Framework 
for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau that set key 
priorities as: strengthening law enforcement, 
SSR, and improving the government’s public 
administration system.81 These priorities were 
crucial in setting the direction of funding for the 
broader international peacebuilding support 
to the country over the subsequent ten years, 
during which nearly half of ODA went to the host 
government and well over half of the international 
peacebuilding funding by international donors 
was categorized as supporting CGF (see Figure 4). 
Ultimately, where the Security Council has 
issued a mandate, the UN and its partners in the 
international community have a strong incentive 
to align resources behind it. As a State-centric 
organization that tends to see stability in terms 
of State monopoly of resources and legitimate 
violence, Council mandates exhibit a strong 
preference for support to the State. The result is 
that settings with Council mandates may be the 
most reliant on (and most likely to support) the 
State, even when the political leadership acts in 
authoritarian, undemocratic ways.
9. A corruption blind spot
Corruption is recognized as one of the most 
important aspects of authoritarian regimes. 
Autocratic governments often misuse public 
funds to enrich their inner circle and support 
a patronage network, while organizations that 
track governance indicators have consistently 
found significant correlations between the 
levels of corruption and those of repression, 
misrule, and centralization of power.82 
Corruption represents one of the greatest 
threats to international support, particularly in 
weak or fragile States where the international 
community has placed a premium on building 
up State capacity. In Somalia, for example, the 
international community spends billions annually 
in support of extension of State authority and 
building State capacity, up to 80 per cent of which 
is reportedly misappropriated via corruption.83
Despite this widespread recognition of the 
links between non-democratic forms of rule 
and corruption, international peacebuilding 
has a recurrent blindspot when it comes to 
corruption as a factor in its programming. In 
the cases reviewed, ODA for peacebuilding rose 
consistently in places like Guinea-Bissau, the DRC, 
and Somalia, despite a steady decline in those 
countries’ governance ratings over a period of 
several years. One expert offered the following 
rationale for this dynamic: “We understand that 
we are pouring funding into corrupt systems, 
but it is our funding that gives us leverage to try 
to change them.”84 The authors’ findings for this 
report suggest that the leverage provided solely 
by fairly unconditional funding streams is at best 
extremely limited.
Perhaps most importantly, corruption rarely 
features in the UN’s public reporting on 
peacebuilding in any detail and is almost never 
central to a Council-mandated operation. This is, 
in part, because corruption tends to be treated 
as a domestic issue below the Council’s radar, 
or a politically sensitive topic that is difficult to 
raise with host governments. In some instances, 
UN leaders must choose between pressing on 
corruption (which may align with internal analysis 
about the causes of instability but could result 
in a loss of consent by the host government) 
or maintaining good relations by avoiding the 
subject altogether. In most cases, the tendency 
appears to be in favour of maintaining positive 
relations with the host government.
The net result is that the UN and international 
donors may come up with a shorthand for 
corruption – frequently it is referred to as 
“underperformance” in programming when 
funds go missing or are not accounted for 
properly – but the links between misuse of 
funds and authoritarian tendencies are rarely, 
if ever, focused upon. “We never talk about 
corruption publicly,” one UN expert noted, “only 
proxy words like ‘lack of political will’ or ‘lack of 
implementation’ of some programmes.” This 
shortcoming creates a serious problem when it 
comes to tracking the material support that the 
UN and others may unintentionally provide to 
authoritarian leaders: misappropriation of funds, 
misuse of resources, or opaque reporting allows 
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political elites to pursue centralizing, repressive 
policies without risk that they will be reported on 
directly. Instead, the UN is consigned to reporting 
on the effects of authoritarianism – human rights 
violations, violent repression, unlawful attempts 
to change constitutional provisions – rather than 
the largely unseen financial forces that enable 
leaders to manipulate power.
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C H A P T E R  3
The previous section outlined the various ways in 
which peacebuilding support may unintentionally 
enable authoritarian tendencies in a range 
of settings. To be clear, the stated intention of 
peacebuilding is specifically the opposite – to 
facilitate inclusive, sustainable peace processes 
that distribute power equitably across societies. 
And in some instances, peacebuilding has 
achieved progress towards those ends. However, 
as the above cases demonstrate, the success of 
peacebuilding is at best uneven, and there is 
some evidence that international interventions 
have at times enabled autocratic leaders to 
concentrate power, marginalize the opposition, 
and undermine democratic institutions. 
The following section builds on the case 
comparison above to offer peacebuilding 
policymakers and practitioners a framework to 
“authoritarian-proof” future interventions, to 
mitigate the risks that peacebuilding support 
will be distorted, co-opted or otherwise directed 
towards authoritarian forms of rule. In some 
respects, this framework builds off existing 
practice of the PBSO, which has already put 
in place some important safeguards and 
approaches to limit unintended consequences, 
and it should also provide a simple, easy-to-use 
approach for UN and bilateral approaches to 
peacebuilding more generally.
Map how power is distributed 
in the system – a political 
economy approach
UN analysis of conflict and post-conflict 
settings tends to cover the political process, 
humanitarian issues, human rights, and economic 
development, often in quite discrete sections of a 
Secretary-General’s report or a thematic report 
by one of the lead UN agencies. Similarly, major 
donor reporting on peacebuilding settings tends 
to identify major political and development 
trends as context for tracking its programmatic 
activities. These analyses can be helpful, but they 
fail to provide the crucial understanding of how 
power and resources are distributed in a given 
system, which would be better achieved via a 
political economy approach. 
In the DRC, for example, the UN’s reports 
(whether MONUSCO’s or via the UN Country 
Team) frequently identified “lack of political 
will” as a major impediment to progress on 
peacebuilding programming but seldom, if 
ever, described the entrenched system of 
patronage that drove this apparent lack of will. 
If peacebuilding is to avoid the unintended 
outcomes of feeding authoritarian tendencies, 
the first step is to accurately and coherently map 
out how power and resources are distributed 
within a given system, including in the informal 
and/or “corrupt” sectors.85 This becomes doubly 
important when countries regain access to IFIs 
that finance directly through State coffers – often 
by capacitating core government functions in 
support of an entrenched elite. According to 
a range of experts, the presence of Peace and 
Development Advisors (PDA) in-country has been 
a major step forward in building the analytic 
capacities of the UN. Expanding and further 
capacitating the PDA programme would be a 
very helpful way to bolster this kind of analysis 
and tie it to UN programming. Other tangible 
steps that the UN and its partners could take 
in this regard could include: (1) more rigorous 
political-economy training for UN staff in field 
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and Headquarters; (2) inclusion of a political 
economy lens in the UN’s Common Country 
Assessments and Secretary-General reports; 
and (3) a stakeholder mapping provided to 
the Security Council, PBC, and donor forums 
(such mapping should identify issues of linkage 
and diffusion described above for donors to 
understand the alternate sources of support 
that host governments may maintain). This 
political economy mapping will additionally 
help to address another endemic challenge 
to UN engagement in fragile settings: the 
tendency to try to preserve the status quo in 
transitional moments. 
As discussed above, the UN builds its 
programming on the basis of host State consent 
and good working relations with the government, 
which can often result in activities that tend to 
protect incumbents and ensure continuity of 
programmes. However, in post-conflict settings, 
the status quo is never fixed and indeed consists 
of an evolving and shifting bargain or set of 
bargains that is continually being renegotiated 
among elites. Analysing those shifting relations 
and the power dynamics behind them will help 
the UN avoid interventions that may bolster 
central elites at the expense of more inclusive 
forms of rule.
Track resources from start  
to finish
Both the UN and major donors have developed 
extremely useful tracking systems for 
peacebuilding, whether through the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee snapshots 
or the Secretary-General’s dashboard systems. 
These have allowed for a broad understanding 
of whether peacebuilding resources are allocated 
to thematic areas like CGF or Inclusive Political 
Processes, and to understand if funds are 
initially disbursed to the State or other agencies. 
However, these broad tracking systems do not 
necessarily tell a complete story about the final 
destination of funds, or indeed the changes 
that the resources brought about. Here, PBSO’s 
practice offers a helpful starting point that 
could be built upon: PBSO demands that every 
peacebuilding project meet certain criteria, such 
as having less than 20 per cent of funds going 
to salaries, ensuring that at least 30 per cent is 
dedicated to gender inclusion, and demanding 
that gender/youth initiatives disburse at least 40 
per cent of funding to local organizations. 
This approach could be expanded to ensure that 
UN and international resources across the board 
are being equitably distributed, and that the UN 
and major donors are able to track the extent to 
which their funding might become concentrated 
in a small elite at the centre. Indeed, within 
2
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the requirement to spend 5-7 per cent of PBF 
funding on monitoring and evaluation, part of 
that monitoring could be geared more specifically 
at analysing potential capture of resources by 
the State. Finally, this research suggests that 
even greater granularity could be brought to the 
question of what constitutes “Core Government 
Functions” or indeed “the State.” As described 
above, proxies are often used to help understand 
the broad direction of resource flows, but it was 
essentially impossible to track exactly where 
support landed or how it worked to enable 
certain elites to maintain power. PBSO’s and 
the OECD’s tracking mechanisms are vital first 
steps that could be substantially built upon to 
give peacebuilders a more exact sense of how 
support might be funnelled into different coffers.
Condition peacebuilding 
support more directly on 
inclusion, especially women 
Under the UN’s current approach, peacebuilding 
resources are distributed in tranches (between 
two and four over the course of a given project), 
and disbursements beyond the initial tranche 
require a showing that the funds are being spent 
and broad programmatic goals met. For example, 
a PBF programme will need to demonstrate 
that at least 75 per cent of the initial funds 
have been spent before a second tranche will 
be disbursed. This approach usefully demands 
that programming show technical progress, but 
it does not condition peacebuilding on other 
important criteria (for example, showing that 
certain stakeholders had been meaningfully 
supported by a project). A tangible step that 
could be included – by the UN and major 
donors – to condition tranches of funding on 
showing that resources were distributed across 
a range of actors, at least 30 per cent of which 
should be identified as contributing to inclusive 
political processes, including specific markers 
for gender inclusion across programming. This 
would require international donors and the 
host government to identify from the outset the 
ways in which they would guarantee equitable 
disbursement of funds and give donors a visible 
way to condition support. Additionally, lessons 
could be learned from the PBC’s practice of 
bringing more diverse groups of interlocutors 
to international forums making decisions 
on peacebuilding priorities – including civil 
society groups, women’s groups, and youth 
representatives in the processes that determine 
how and whether peacebuilding support is 
provided. This approach should be considered 
as PBSO launches a review on the links between 
local and national peacebuilding in 2021.
Build a coherent signalling 
strategy with teeth attached 
A wide range of cases demonstrate that robust 
and coherent political signalling can have a strong 
impact on the decisions of leaders, often helping 
to shape their behaviour towards more inclusive 
approaches to governance. In contrast, where 
messaging is incoherent and/or not backed up 
with concrete actions, it may implicitly indicate 
that the costs of authoritarian behaviour are 
outweighed by its immediate benefits. When 
developing a strategy for engagement in a 
country with high risks of authoritarianism, the 
UN and international partners should explicitly 
identify how signalling and messaging will be 
developed, including by: (1) identifying common 
messaging that can be delivered by a range of 
actors (e.g. regional organizations, the Security 
Council, IFIs, neighbouring countries, major 
donors); (2) identifying clear common red lines 
that will trigger a change in stance (e.g. shifts 
in an electoral timeframe, failure to implement 
certain reforms, repressive behaviour by security 
services); and (3) agreeing ahead of time on 
concrete actions that will result from crossing 
a red line (e.g. imposition of sanctions, cutting 
diplomatic ties, a shift in UN programming in-
country). These steps should not be done in 
secret but should be developed in the open 
for the incumbent elite to have clear public 
signals of the costs of authoritarian backsliding. 
Some specific steps that could be taken in this 
context include: 
a. Revisit the Secretary-General’s 2009 Policy 
Committee decision on unconstitutional 
transfers of power. This decision usefully 
creates a triggering mechanism for the 
UN to respond when there is a transfer 
of power (or indeed the perpetuation of 
leadership) beyond constitutional term 
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limits. This policy could be expanded based 
on an identification of other red lines around 
authoritarian backsliding, requiring the UN 
to escalate its decision-making process in a 
broader range of settings.
b. Apply the present framework to the UN/
World Bank partnership. Over recent 
years, the UN/World Bank partnership has 
deepened significantly, based in part on the 
joint analysis in the 2018 Pathways for Peace 
report. The research for this report suggests 
that the role of IFIs is especially important, in 
part because they offer far larger resources 
than many other institutions, potentially 
enabling even greater capture by elites if the 
necessary safeguards are not put in place. 
Indeed, IFIs tend to be quite reserved when 
conditioning support on some of the issues 
raised in this report focusing mainly on the 
expenditure of funds. The UN/World Bank 
partnership could therefore be a forum 
where the issue of authoritarianism – and 
the ways in which it negatively impacts 
inequalities and marginalization – are 
taken forward.
c. Require a theory of change in peacebuilding 
programming. The PBF’s practice of 
requiring that recipient entities develop 
a theory of change in order to receive 
funding is an important one that could 
be expanded across peacebuilding more 
generally. Specifically, incorporating a 
theory of change into the monitoring and 
evaluation aspects of peacebuilding could 
help build greater conditionality into 
support, holding recipients to account for 
developing inclusive, impactful programmes 
rather than only measuring programmes by 
expenditures. 
Engage the neighbourhood 
The 2018 UN reform has placed a premium on 
the Organization’s development of regional 
strategies, which are now in place for West Africa/
Sahel, Central Africa, the Horn of Africa, and 
Western Asia. These strategies, however, have 
largely stayed at a quite high level, articulating 
broad regional goals and dynamics without 
meaningfully driving programming to date 
(the exception may be the Sahel Development 
Plan). As described above, issues of regional 
diffusion and linkage mean that regional players 
are fundamentally important to checking or 
enabling authoritarian tendencies within a given 
country. For example, having President Museveni 
in charge of mediating the 2015 electoral crisis 
in Burundi may provide important regional 
leverage, but it also suggests that combatting 
authoritarianism may not be a key priority, given 
Museveni’s deep entrenchment in Uganda’s 
political system.86 In future iterations of these 
regional strategies, DPPA should explore how 
the concepts of linkage and diffusion might affect 
programming, and should connect regional 
approaches explicitly with an analysis of the risks 
of authoritarian backsliding.
Consider risks of 
authoritarianism in  
transitional moments 
The transition from a UN peacekeeping mission 
to a smaller peacebuilding or Country Team-led 
presence offers an opportunity to change the 
narrative around a country, signalling that it has 
turned a positive corner and no longer requires 
more intrusive, forceful forms of intervention. 
These transitions are often accompanied by 
a concerted effort by the UN and partners to 
increase funding streams, open up new lines of 
credit with IFIs, and eliminate constraints like 
sanctions or other impediments to aid. Here, the 
UN has a built-in tendency to promote positive 
narratives about a country’s leadership, even 
when there are worrying signs that international 
support may be captured or distorted by 
the political elite. Indeed, the risks may be 
highest in these transitional moments, given 
the likelihood that national leaders must also 
consolidate power and at times deal with restless 
opposition groups. 
Based on the research presented here, the result 
is often that the transition to peacebuilding is 
accompanied by more concentrated flows 
of resources and political attention to CGF, 
including by IFIs which have a strong tendency 
to support State institutions. Importantly, as 
governments graduate from IMF-monitored 




with IFIs, conditionality on the loans should take 
into consideration how support to the central 
executive might enable exclusionary politics. As 
UN presences are reconfigured, special attention 
should be paid to these dynamics, and the 
UN should look to generate leverage through 
conditionality and clear messaging around its 
peacebuilding support during these periods.87
Support UN leadership  
in-country to push back  
on authoritarianism 
The UN system (rightly, in the view of the 
authors) delegates much of the decision-
making about peacebuilding to its leadership 
in-country. Resident Coordinators and mission 
leaders develop priorities and programming 
proposals for PBF funding, and these actors 
are also responsible for maintaining relations 
with the host authorities. This often places UN 
leadership in a difficult position, needing to 
maintain positive relations (and indeed consent) 
with the host government but also having to 
implement programmes geared at inclusion. 
As the Cambodia, Haiti, and DRC case studies 
demonstrate, there is a strong tendency within 
the UN system to privilege the relationship 
with the host government, adopting pragmatic 
approaches that may undercut the UN’s 
ability to counter the forces of repression and 
centralization of resources typical of authoritarian 
settings. Indeed, even the 2018 reform process, 
which ostensibly gave Resident Coordinators a 
more political role, has not provided UN leaders 
with a clear set of tools or overt top-cover to 
empower them to push back on authoritarian 
backsliding. When, for example, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of 
the UN Mission in Somalia was declared persona 
non grata in 2019 based on the mission’s human 
rights statements, the UN’s response was muted, 
sending an unambiguous signal to the Somali 
Government that the political and economic 
costs of flouting human rights were relatively 
low. Some concrete steps that could be taken 
within the UN system (and indeed potentially 
emulated within bilateral systems) would include: 
(1) clear messaging in the compacts between the 
Secretary-General and in-country UN leadership 
on the expectations that leadership will uphold 
human rights standards even at the cost of 
persona non grata (including commitments by 
the Secretary-General to respond robustly 
in support of in-country representatives); (2) 
include in reports to the Security Council, PBC 
and other forums an analysis of the risks of 
authoritarianism, with recommendations for 
mandates that will explicitly address those 
risks; and (3) development of a joint approach 
across the UN, IFIs and donors involving 
financial penalties (e.g. sanctions or reductions 
in aid) in cases where host governments expel 
UN leadership.
Taken together, this framework proposes a re-
examination of the elite bargain at the heart 
of much of the UN’s conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding paradigm. It suggests that the 
tendency of the UN to identify solutions based 
on a core group of powerful elites may appear 
necessary to mitigate the immediate risks of 
escalation, but that it also carries significant 
risks of longer-term drift into the kind of 
deeply unequal, highly centralized rule that 
the Sustaining Peace resolutions and the UN/
World Bank Pathways report have identified 
as the major drivers of instability globally. 
Implementation of this framework will not 
necessarily mean jettisoning the elite bargain, but 
it will require that peacebuilders strike a balance 
between the exigencies of day-to-day conflict 
prevention and the ways in which international 
interventions might unintentionally bolster 
authoritarianism in the longer term.
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C A S E  S T U D Y  1
The UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) followed a period of over twenty years 
of civil conflict and had an ambitious mandate to 
oversee a complicated transition to peace and 
a new era of electoral politics. At the time it was 
deployed in March 1992, the mission was one of 
the largest and most authoritative operations in 
the UN’s history, with authorization for 15,900 
peacekeeping troops, 3,600 civilian police, 3,000 
administration staff, and a wide-ranging set of 
political objectives.
UNTAC’s mandate was included as an annex 
to the Paris Peace Agreement that brought an 
end to the Cambodia conflict, signed in October 
1991.88 The mission was given several distinct 
tasks, including monitoring the ceasefire 
between the parties, overseeing demobilization 
and cantonment, the repatriation of refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and, crucially, 
ensuring a ‘neutral political environment’ for free 
and fair elections. 
To ensure help create the conditions for free 
and fair elections, UNTAC was also authorized 
to ‘supervise and control’ several key elements 
of Cambodia’s civil administration. UNTAC 
was, thus, charged not only with creating the 
conditions for peace, but also with engaging 
in ambitious State-building activities to lay the 
foundations for a durable democracy in a country 
that had experienced decades of violence and 
political polarization. 
UNTAC was deployed for 18 months and after 
its withdrawal was widely hailed as a success 
story of multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping. 
In particular, the peaceful conduct of the 
May 1993 election in the context of sustained 
non-compliance by the Khmer Rouge and 
obstructionist policies of the Cambodian 
Government was heralded as a major 
achievement, and UNTAC terminated its mission 
in September of 1993, having delivered a core 
element of its mandate in the face of significant 
challenges.89
However, the positive story of UNTAC’s impact 
was qualified in important ways. First, the 
mission conspicuously failed to achieve some 
of its other central objectives, including the 
disarmament of all the parties to the conflict and 
the proper control and supervision over the civil 
administration of the State. Second, although the 
organization of peaceful elections was a major 
accomplishment, UNTAC’s wider contribution to 
Cambodia’s democratic transition was not always 
consistent and at times fell considerably below 
the democratic standards it set out to promote. 
This case study focuses on the historical impact 
of UNTAC in the period in which it was deployed 
in 1992-93, with particular reference to events 
before and after the 1993 elections. Cambodia’s 
subsequent political trajectory under the 
leadership of Hun Sen, and especially its descent 
into a form of closed (rather than competitive) 
authoritarianism in recent years, lies outside the 
scope of this study. 
Challenges of Implementation 
Part of the explanation for the early glowing 
reviews of UNTAC related to the fact that it had 
achieved key elements of its mandate in the face 
of significant challenges. The legacies of over 
two decades of conflict in Cambodia had created 
a very inhospitable environment for political 
reconciliation and democratic transformation. 
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Over two million people are estimated to have 
been killed during the conflict of the 1970s and 
Cambodia’s society and economy had been 
scarred by the brutality of the conflict and the 
years of international isolation that Cambodia 
had experienced. As UNTAC’s Human Rights 
component noted: “Cambodian society was 
singularly lacking in the basic institutions 
and structures upon which the safeguarding 
of fundamental human rights depends an 
independent judiciary, an effective and non-
political bureaucracy, a professional police 
force, a free press, and human rights and other 
non-governmental organizations representing 
popular interests.”90 Cambodia also had a limited 
history of democracy, and when UNTAC arrived 
most of the preconditions that usually associated 
democracy (economic development, a middle 
class, civil society) were absent. 
UNTAC also faced two immediate challenges 
from local parties to the peace agreement who 
sought to obstruct the mission from carrying 
out its full mandate. The Khmer Rouge quickly 
made clear that they would not cooperate with 
the demobilization process that UNTAC was 
tasked with overseeing and refused to give up 
weapons or allow for the cantonment of their 
troops. They also blocked the UN from deploying 
staff into the territory they controlled and began 
a violent campaign against the Cambodian 
Government and the UNTAC operation itself. 
In the face of increasing violence, the mission 
considered postponing the elections scheduled 
for May 1993, but ultimately decided to reorient 
its security deployment to the goal of ensuring a 
peaceful and secure political environment for the 
registration and polling process.91
The mission also faced obstruction from the 
Cambodian authorities led by Hun Sen and the 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), particularly 
in the area of civil administration. According 
to its mandate, UNTAC had the authority to 
control and supervise civil administration within 
Cambodia, and to take executive decisions in a 
range of policy areas. In reality, the administrative 
structures of the State had been controlled by the 
CPP and its predecessor party for many years, 
and CPP leadership systematically sought to 
prevent UNTAC from exercising its full powers. 
The challenge faced by UNTAC in this arena is 
illustrated by the disparity in personnel between 
the mission and the governing authorities on the 
ground. The Cambodian State administration 
had an estimated 200,000 staff compared to 
800 UN civil administration staff, creating a 
systematic imbalance of authority on the ground 
that undermined a key element of the mission’s 
mandate.92 The Hun Sen-led Government, thus, 
had a structural advantage over both the UN 
operation and the other political factions that 
allowed it to set its own terms in key areas of the 
peace implementation process. 
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Enabling in Cambodia 
The peaceful elections of May 1993 led many to 
conclude that the UN mission had been largely 
successful in promoting democracy in Cambodia. 
There had been genuine fears that the elections 
would have to be cancelled or would be marred 
by serious violence, so the peaceful nature of the 
vote was a significant achievement. However, 
the CPP-led authorities in Cambodia, under the 
leadership of Hun Sen, showed little genuine 
commitment to democracy and took blatant, and 
often violent, measures to ensure they would not 
lose power. Hun Sen showed no willingness to 
relinquish power, even after coming second in 
the elections, and many observers considered 
the power-sharing agreement that followed to 
be a betrayal of the election process in which the 
opposition party, the National United Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative 
Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), had emerged victorious. 
As outlined earlier, authoritarian enabling comes 
in two principal forms: capacity-building and 
signalling. In Cambodia, the enabling dynamics 
associated with UNTAC relate primarily to the 
latter category and focus in particular on how 
the mission reacted (or failed to react) to efforts 
by the CPP to undermine the electoral process 
and maintain its position in power through 
non-democratic means. While UNTAC did try to 
constrain and condemn the CPP’s behaviour, at 
various points it responded weakly to the political 
abuses carried by the CPP and it failed to fully 
confront Hun Sen and his party for their actions. 
The following sections focus on two key areas 
where these dynamics can be most clearly seen: 
the election campaign and the process of post-
election coalition formation. 
Enabling through Signalling: 
Election Campaign 
The UN oversaw all aspects of the electoral 
process, including voter registration, voter 
education and polling. While the technical 
elements of the process such as registration 
and polling went well, the campaign period 
itself was marred by serious irregularities, 
including political intimidation, violence, and a 
skewed information environment. Each of the 
parties engaged in intensive propaganda efforts 
to discredit and delegitimize their opponents, 
portraying the other as genocidal agents who 
posed a fundamental threat to Cambodia’s very 
existence.93 The campaign also featured extensive 
use of coercion to intimidate and threaten voters, 
and violence became a common feature of the 
election process. The Khmer Rouge initiated a 
series of attacks on the general public as well as 
UNTAC personnel in March 1993, raising serious 
questions over the security of polling. 
While the Khmer Rouge sought to frustrate the 
overall electoral process, the CPP authorities 
were implicated in violations of political rights 
designed to affect the outcome of the election 
in their own favour. The CPP effectively ran a 
dual campaign, split between its public efforts 
and a clandestine campaign of violence and 
intimidation. The party repeatedly declared that 
FUNCINPEC was secretly aligned with, and even 
controlled by, the Khmer Rouge and sought to 
brand FUNCINPEC as criminals who threatened 
the basic security of Cambodians.94 Behind the 
public campaign, the party also orchestrated a 
ruthless project designed to suppress opposition 
mobilization and instil fear within the general 
public. The party sought to systematically 
collect the registration cards that UNTAC was 
distributing to voters in an effort to exert control 
over them, and only reversed the policy after 
intense UNTAC criticism. The CPP also forced 
local villagers to come to party offices and sign 
up to the party en masse, informing them that 
they now had to vote for the CPP. 
More troublingly, the CPP was implicated in a 
campaign of political violence against opposition 
parties in the months preceding the elections, 
most of which targeted FUNCINPEC. Party offices 
were attacked with grenades and rockets, and 
several FUNCNIPEC activists were killed in 
politically-motivated attacks. UN investigations 
often implicated members of the State’s security 
forces, including police and military members. 
An internal UNTAC investigation also concluded 
that the CPP was coordinating a network of 
secret security units that were being used to tilt 
the electoral playing field away from opposition 
parties, using methods including assassinations 
of key figures, attacks on party offices and voter 
intimidation.95 During the transitional period, 
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UNTAC’s Human Rights Component tracked 
these various forms of human rights violation 
and logged over 450 killings in total, which 
included 159 summary executions of political 
opponents. The CPP was found responsible for 
the overwhelming majority of cases of politically-
motivated harassment and intimidation.96
UNTAC RESPONSE
The UN mission took several steps to address 
the increasing levels of political violence and 
intimidation in the months before the election, 
but it struggled to offer a forceful response that 
exacted any real costs on the perpetrators. In the 
face of a sustained campaign of political violence, 
it offered several signals that continued violations 
would not be seriously punished and continued 
to work closely with the main perpetrators within 
the CPP leadership. 
The first strategy that UNTAC pursued rested 
on persuasion and involved a series of public 
and private efforts to encourage and cajole the 
various factions to pursue peaceful campaign 
strategies and to respect each other’s right to 
exist and compete in the elections. UNTAC’s SRSG, 
Yasushi Akashi, made public statements calling 
for a stop to the violence and various mission 
officials wrote letters to their counterparts 
within the political parties urging them to 
respect democratic norms and procedures. For 
example, in March 1993, the SRSG issued a public 
statement to the Supreme National Council, the 
principal national-level consultative body during 
the transition period, declaring that politically-
motivated violence was unacceptable.97 UNTAC 
also helped forge agreement on a new Code 
of Conduct to be used by all parties in the 
campaign period.
However, UNTAC struggled to back up this 
rhetorical condemnation with meaningful 
enforcement measures, and thus sent very 
weak signals of its commitment to upholding 
democratic standards. This not only reflected 
the lack of enforcement power the mission had 
to compel the parties to change their behaviour, 
but also divisions within the mission about 
how best to proceed. UNTAC senior leadership 
was divided between a pragmatic camp, which 
wished to maintain good relations with the 
main political parties in order to secure the best 
outcome possible to the peace process, and 
a more hardline camp that advocated a more 
confrontational stance against the CPP.98 SRSG 
Akashi was in the former camp – though he often 
spoke out in favour of a credible elections process 
– and the mission’s actions largely reflected his 
non-confrontational approach. 
UNTAC’s mandate, as set out in the Paris 
Agreement, included provisions that the mission 
could investigate complaints concerning human 
rights and election irregularities and take 
“appropriate corrective action.”99 However, 
the mandate was silent on what this meant in 
practice, and did not specify the specific powers 
that the mission could use in order to take 
corrective action in the event that the mission’s 
investigations found clear evidence of abuse. 
This contributed to a lack of direct or effective 
action by the mission in the face of the CPP’s 
intense campaign of violence and intimidation. 
The mission did attempt to sanction individual 
CPP officials under its ‘control’ mandate (e.g. by 
removing them from their positions), but these 
efforts were limited and were met with stiff 
resistance. UNTAC’s lack of robust enforcement 
in the face of CPP intransigence is a central and 
recurring feature of the mission’s tenure. 
UNTAC did attempt several forms of ‘corrective 
action’. These efforts began with attempts to 
have individuals tried within Cambodia’s own 
courts, but this approach was undermined by 
the twin challenge of the weakness of Cambodia’s 
judicial system and the obstructionist policies 
of the CPP. Capacity for trials was limited and 
even when individual cases came before a judge, 
the politicization of the judiciary effectively 
eliminated the prospects of a fair trial. In one 
case, the Ministry of Justice simply instructed a 
judge not to hear a case brought by UNTAC and 
threatened to punish the judge if he continued.100 
Unsurprisingly, the case was dropped. 
An important test-case of UNTAC’s resolve 
concerned the actions of the Governor of the 
Province of Battambang, located in the north-
west of Cambodia on the border with Thailand. 
Battambang was a frontline province in the civil 
conflict during the 1980s, home to the Khmer 
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Rouge’s leadership base and armed forces from 
the other wings of the resistance movement. 
As a result, the province had become heavily 
securitized and the provincial authorities were 
dominated by the military.101 UNTAC identified 
the provincial Governor, Ung Samy, as a key 
figure behind the political violence in the region 
and decided to take the unusual step of using the 
powers granted in the Paris Peace Agreement to 
order his dismissal. However, the CPP responded 
in defiant fashion, and stated that they would 
cease cooperation with UNTAC if the Governor 
was removed.102 In the face of open resistance, 
UNTAC backed down. No sanctions were 
levied against the Battambang Governor and 
violence continued in the weeks leading up to 
the elections.
In January 1993, the SRSG responded to 
mounting pressure to act more forcefully and 
established a Special Prosecutor’s Office to 
pursue perpetrators of human rights violations. 
However, the new office only oversaw the 
arrest of a small number of suspects, and the 
government frustrated any efforts to bring the 
suspects to trial. Troop-contributing countries to 
the mission also placed restrictions on the use of 
their troops in executing warrants and arresting 
suspects, arguing that these activities went 
beyond UNTAC’s peacekeeping mandate and 
entailing peacemaking activities.103 Consequently, 
the new and innovative Prosecutor’s Office was 
more imposing on paper than it was in reality. 
The combined approach of forceful rhetorical 
condemnation but limited follow-through in 
the face of sustained political violence and 
intimidation led to significant criticism of the 
mission. Human Rights Watch argued that: 
“UNTAC too often subordinated human rights 
protection to keeping the peace process on track’ 
and criticized the repeated lack of action against 
CPP officials.”104 UNTAC’s own officials offered 
similar criticisms, citing a ‘don’t rock the boat’ 
mentality within the mission.105 UNTAC’s Human 
Rights Component issued an unusually frank 
Final Report in 1993, which identified a number 
of points of disagreement within the mission 
and lamented the lack of a “pro-active and at 
times protagonist role needed to fulfil UNTAC’s 
human rights mandate.”106 In particular, the 
report highlighted the ways in which the different 
components of the mission had sometimes 
competing priorities and outlooks, and that 
this clash of interests and ideas led at times to a 
weak commitment to human rights protection. 
Citing a “lack of enforcement philosophy” within 
UNTAC, the report echoed the criticisms of 
Human Right Watch and argued that too much 
priority was given to ensuring cooperation of 
all parties to the conflict. The SRSG Akashi later 
returned fire, dismissing the Human Rights 
Components proposals as “radical” and based 
on unrealistically high standards in the context 
of Cambodian reality.107
These tensions over how to respond to the CPP 
resurfaced after the elections were complete. 
While observers were united in welcoming the 
peaceful nature of the elections given the fear 
of a surge of violence as polling approached, 
criticisms quickly emerged again regarding the 
outcome of the May 1993 elections. 
Enabling through Signalling:  
Post-Election Power-sharing 
Deal 
The May elections went off largely peacefully and 
the fears of a violent attack were not realized. 
Over four and a half million Cambodians had 
registered for the elections, and the final turnout 
was 89.5 per cent. In early June, the Secretary-
General declared the result free and fair.108 The 
peaceful nature of the vote and the high levels 
of enthusiastic participation of the Cambodian 
public jointly account for much of UNTAC’s 
reputation as a successful mission.109
Twenty political parties had registered for the 
elections, but in practice the vote was largely split 
between the two most well-established parties 
prior to the arrival of UNTAC. FUNCINPEC was 
the largest party with 45.5 per cent of the vote, 
and the CPP was second with 38.2 per cent. The 
results came as a surprise, as many had assumed 
the CPP’s intimidation campaign would seriously 
suppress the vote for FUNCINPEC. Instead, it 
appeared to have had the reverse effect and 
created a backlash against the CPP and its 
campaign of violence. 
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The Paris Agreement stipulated that the 
elections would lead to the creation of an interim 
Constituent Assembly that would draft and 
approve a constitution and then transform itself 
into a legislature, which in turn would create a 
new government. However, the agreement was 
vague on how the Assembly would be structured 
and where authority would lie during the three-
month constitution-writing process. As a result, 
the post-election period quickly involved efforts 
to arrange some form of political agreement 
that would lead to shared authority within 
the Constituent Assembly. The logic of the 
constitution drafting process demanded some 
form of cooperation, as the constitution could 
only be ratified with two-thirds majority of the 
Assembly. Either of the two major parties could 
thus veto the constitution if they were excluded 
from the process. 
In the weeks that followed the release of the 
election results, the Cambodian parties and 
assorted international officials (both from the 
UN and individual embassies) engaged in a 
series of manoeuvres that culminated in a deal 
between FUNCINPEC and the CPP in June 1993. 
The process was fraught and UNTAC was widely 
criticized for endorsing the outcome, which left 
the CPP in power after elections that many felt 
should be interpreted as an outright rejection of 
CPP rule. 
The power-sharing efforts were marked 
by continuation of the CPP’s obstructionist 
tendencies through different means. First, the 
party objected to the election results. Even before 
the counting was finished, the CPP began to claim 
that the elections were marked by irregularities, 
and the party demanded a re-run in several 
provinces.110 The CPP also engaged in ‘intensive 
politicking’ to protect their control on power 
during the power-sharing talks.111 This initially 
entailed efforts to lobby the elder statesman (and 
former King of Cambodia) Prince Sihanouk over 
the shape of a potential government in which the 
CPP would retain a major share of power. Military 
generals and senior CPP politicians sought to 
meet with Sihanouk and promote arrangements 
that would keep the CPP in power. 
When these efforts were initially unsuccessful, 
sectors of the CPP further destabilized the 
political landscape by launching a putative 
secessionist campaign in several eastern 
provinces with Cambodia. Although it was a 
short-lived effort that soon fizzled out, it was 
widely attributed to a CPP pressure campaign to 
ensure movement on power-sharing and it was 
not without consequences.112
These developments initially seemed to seriously 
damage the prospects for a power-sharing deal. 
However, relations between the parties improved 
as UNTAC and key States sought to mediate an 
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agreement, and talks intensified in mid-June. 
On 16 June, Prince Sihanouk announced a deal, 
with the FUNCINPEC leader Prince Ranariddh 
and Hun Sen sharing power as co-premiers and 
Prince Sihanouk acting as Head of State. The deal 
included a division of portfolios that ensured 
the non-CPP parties had a majority. UNTAC 
and Akashi in particular were reported to have 
supported the negotiation efforts and threw their 
weight behind the deal.113
The agreement, however, was very controversial 
and was in many ways a product of the CPP’s 
entrenched power and intransigence. Prince 
Sihanouk acknowledged that the CPP had 
effectively bribed their way into the power-
sharing coalition, observing that the CPP had 
given FUNCINPEC the ultimatum that ‘if you 
don’t share power, there will be secession and 
civil war’.114
The SRSG acknowledged that ‘one can question 
the legitimacy and stability’ of a deal that gave 
equal weight to the two main parties, but he 
argued that “we have to admit the practical 
wisdom of combining the ‘new wind’, represented 
by the victorious FUNCINPEC, consisting mostly 
of upper and upper-middle class intellectuals 
aspiring to the restoration of the monarchy, 
with the experience and power of CPP, which is 
authoritarian but has 14 years of administrative 
experience, with much of the army and the 
police under its control.”115 As with the UN’s 
thinking behind the decision not to postpone the 
elections, Akashi’s comments reflect a preference 
for pragmatic and practical outcomes that allow 
for political progress rather than the prioritization 
and enforcement of democratic principles that 
would alienate parties to the peace process. 
For some observers, both inside and outside 
of UNTAC, the UN’s willingness to endorse the 
deal represented a betrayal of its commitment 
to democracy. One longstanding observer of 
human rights issues in the country identified it 
as the ‘original sin’ that contributed to Hun Sen’s 
enduring authoritarian rule.116 Separately, a 
human rights officer within UNTAC suggested 
the UN had “sold out” the Cambodian people and 
caved into the CPP, describing it as a “horrible 
sacrifice of values and a repudiation of values and 
principles” by the UN.117 Some UNTAC officials 
argue that the UN leadership should have shown 
more resolve in facing down the CPP rather than 
seeking to ensure their participation in the peace 
process at all costs.118
Conclusion
UNTAC’s key political challenge came down to a 
balancing act between, on one hand, enforcing 
its full mandate in the face of flagrant non-
compliance and political violence, and on the 
other hand prioritizing the peace process and 
ensuring the continued participation of the main 
parties. As one long-standing Cambodia specialist 
(and senior member of UNTAC’s Information 
and Education Component) concluded, UNTAC 
ultimately engaged in “calculated appeasement” 
of the CPP authorities, working to curb their 
worst excesses but acquiescing to their blatant 
and repeated violations of the political provisions 
of the Paris Agreement in order to maintain 
their participation in the electoral and peace 
processes.119 The balancing act was performed 
in favour of pragmatism rather than principle, 
and there is clear evidence that UNTAC played a 
role in enabling the authoritarianism of Hun Sen 
and the CPP. 
A variety of factors contributed to the mission’s 
inability, or unwillingness, to directly confront the 
CPP authorities and enabling their ongoing rule:
• Mandate: UNTAC’s mandate reflected the 
political compromises that were necessary 
to secure all parties’ acceptance of the 
Paris Peace Agreement. The necessity for 
compromise resulted in relatively weak 
enforcement powers (a Chapter VI rather 
than Chapter VII resolution) compared to 
the ambition of the mandate in other areas. 
The stipulation that UNTAC would ‘control’ 
parts of the Cambodian administration 
was undefined and lacking in enforcement 
powers. 
• Power imbalance: The CPP controlled 
almost 200,000 State officials compared 
to just a few hundred staff in the Civil 
Administration Component and, in practice, 
UNTAC thus depended on the very people 
it was supposed to be ‘controlling’ to 
implement much of its peacebuilding work. 
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• Deployment and Resources: Painfully slow 
deployment and limited resources meant 
that UNTAC took a long time to come to 
full strength and lost the opportunity to 
establish its authority early on. Several 
key components of the mission, including 
the Civil Administration component 
charged with overseeing local government 
departments, lacked staff with crucial local 
knowledge and expertise. 
• Competing Priorities: The mission had to 
balance competing objectives, especially 
with respect to ensuring cooperation of all 
the parties in the peace process while also 
promoting human rights and democracy. 
The UN itself was also occupied with 
competing crises, especially in Yugoslavia, 
and UNTAC did not always get the full 
attention and support from New York that 
it required. There was immense pressure, 
in one of the most expensive peacebuilding 
missions to date, to have a short timetable 
and to leave quickly after the elections. 
• Leadership: The Cambodia case also 
highlights the important role that Special 
Representatives can play in shaping UN 
responses on the ground. While some 
observers felt that SRSG Akashi struck the 
right balance in prioritizing the cooperation 
of the major parties over the enforcement 
of democratic norms, others criticized what 
they perceived as a passive leadership 
style in the face of blatant violations of the 
Paris Accords.
Overall, the Cambodian case highlights some 
of the key trade-offs involved in divergent 
approached to enforcement action, and the risks 
that come with either confronting or enabling 
authoritarian elites in post-conflict settings. 
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C A S E  S T U D Y  2
In contrast to some of the other countries 
explored in this report, the role of the UN in 
shaping Haiti’s political trajectory is somewhat 
less clear-cut. Haiti has seen both periods of 
democratic consolidation and authoritarian 
backsliding over the past three decades, along 
with the strong and intrusive role of international 
actors other than the UN, most notably the US. 
The country has experienced coups, violence, 
and rule by decree, interspersed with periods 
of relatively stable governance and free and fair 
elections. These phases tend to be short-lived, 
however, usually giving way to deadlock, unrest, 
and political turmoil – most recently, there have 
been widespread violent protests against the 
current president Jovenel Moïse in February 
2021. 
The UN has been involved in Haiti since 1993, 
initially through a series of relatively short 
capacity-building and peacekeeping missions: 
UNMIH (1993-96 – effectively suspended from 
1993-95), UNSMIH (1996-97), UNTMIH (1997), 
and MIPONUH (1997-2000). These missions were 
generally aimed at supporting and consolidating 
democratic governance and enhancing the 
capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP), 
sometimes alongside or following Security 
Council-authorized US-led military interventions. 
These operations experienced some successes, 
but were often obstructed by national actors or 
overtaken by outbreaks of violence, and the last 
of these shorter missions withdrew in 2000.
Subsequently, in 2004, the Security Council 
authorized and deployed MINUSTAH after the 
removal of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from 
power by a coalition of opposition forces and the 
hasty installation of a transitional government 
in February that year.120 In comparison with the 
short missions of the 1990s, which had limited 
and specific objectives, MINUSTAH’s was wide-
ranging and included the restoration of security 
and stability, promotion of a democratic political 
process, institutional development, electoral 
assistance, and promotion of the rule of law and 
human rights.121 After the devastating earthquake 
that struck Haiti in January 2010, it also played a 
crucial role in coordinating relief efforts, providing 
logistical, administrative, and security support for 
humanitarian operations; support to the HNP; 
technical advice; reconstruction support; and 
a public information campaign.122 The mission 
was of course also well known for the numerous 
scandals that marked its tenure, including sexual 
exploitation and abuse (SEA) by troops and the 
cholera epidemic caused by poor sanitation in 
one of its camps. The mission remained in Haiti 
until 2017, when it was succeeded by MINUJUSTH, 
which was mandated to support rule of law, 
the justice sector, the HNP, and human rights. 
MINUJUSTH closed in 2019, ending 15 years of 
consecutive UN peace operations in the country. 
This report will focus on MINUSTAH, which was 
the longest-lasting, largest, and most expansive 
mission in Haiti, with nearly 15,000 personnel at 
its peak and, as noted, a far-reaching mandate 
that emphasized the restoration of democracy. 
In addition, MINUSTAH was present both during 
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periods of relative stability and during periods of 
significant political turmoil. Indeed, when it first 
deployed in 2004, the country was in the midst of 
a serious political crisis. Subsequently, the tenure 
of René Préval, though by no means without 
tension, mismanagement, and conflict, was 
relatively stable. By contrast, the rule of Michel 
Martelly, who took over after Préval left office in 
2011, was again marked by serious moves toward 
authoritarianism, including rule by decree for a 
period of one year. MINUSTAH’s presence during 
these various changes to the political trajectory of 
the country therefore facilitates the identification 
of patterns of action and inaction on the part of 
the UN that may have inadvertently enabled 
authoritarian behaviour by the various regimes 
that held power at the time.
Enabling in Haiti
While Haiti has seen periods of democratic 
consolidation, and the UN’s mandates have 
particularly emphasized the restoration 
and consolidation of nascent democratic 
processes in the country, it has also consistently 
experienced episodes of severe authoritarian 
backsliding, ranging from electoral malpractice 
to violent crackdowns on protesters and rule 
by decree. Throughout these episodes, there 
has been evidence of inadvertent enabling 
of authoritarianism by the UN, where it has 
prioritized stability, the retention of host country 
consent, and the rapid holding of elections 
above the quality of the political process and the 
establishment of oversight and accountability 
mechanisms for the security sector. As elsewhere, 
this was not the UN’s intention – indeed, it has 
been the opposite, and the UN has both pushed 
strongly for elections that would not otherwise 
have happened and has often simply attempted 
to prevent a descent into violence. However, 
through capacity-building of both political 
institutions and the security sector, and signalling 
about the low costs of authoritarianism, the 
UN may have boosted the regime’s ability to 




The first way in which the UN has unintentionally 
enabled authoritarianism in Haiti is through its 
efforts to build the capacity of the government. 
As elsewhere, a lack of capacity was seen as a 
major obstacle to the consolidation of stable, 
democratic rule in Haiti, the ability of various 
Presidents to ward off violent challenges 
to their power, and the routing of popular 
discontent through the ballot box. As a result, 
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enhancing the capacity of the government in 
terms of both institutions and security was seen 
as key to sustainable peace and democratic 
development.123
THE UN AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
MINUSTAH’s initial mandate included support 
to State institutions124 and fostering and 
promoting democratic change was seen as a 
priority. However, its efforts in this regard may 
have inadvertently enabled authoritarianism 
in two ways: a heavy emphasis on protecting 
and strengthening the executive and a focus 
on the holding of elections at the expense of 
other institutions. 
The 1987 Haitian constitution established a 
semi-presidential system that included a strong 
executive, but also delegated a significant check-
and-balances function to parliament and to local 
assemblies.125 This was because it was adopted 
after three decades of dictatorship under 
François Duvalier, and was therefore specifically 
intended to be ‘anti-dictatorial’ and to prevent 
the emergence of new autocratic rulers.126 
However, the complex rules governing executive 
versus legislative authority frequently led to 
deadlock in Haiti’s institutions and prevented 
the passage of legislation. In order to overcome 
this, MINUSTAH and other international partners 
pushed for constitutional reforms in 2012 that, 
in effect, removed some of the constraints on 
the presidency at the expense of parliament and 
local government.127 For example, the reforms 
gave the president greater power in appointing 
the prime minister and provided for direct 
appointment of mayors. 
The intention of these reforms was not specifically 
to strengthen the executive branch – instead, 
the aim was to demonstrate to Haitians that 
institutions of governance could function better 
than previously and they were viewed by the 
mission as a “promising political development.”128 
The constitutional reforms also included other 
broadly liberal amendments, including the 
establishment of a Permanent Electoral Council 
(CEP), strengthening oversight of the police, 
and measures to promote women’s political 
participation. Moreover, a strong executive is 
not necessarily authoritarian, as long as there 
are adequate accountability mechanisms and 
checks and balances in place. However, over 
time, the executive had begun to co-opt other 
institutions in order to extend its authority and 
tighten its grip on power. The reforms were 
thus undertaken in a context in which “Haiti…
had a domineering presidency and a legislative 
branch of government that…function[ed] 
as an extension of the executive branch.”129 
The overall effect of the reforms was, thus, to 
entrench the dominance of the presidency at 
the expense of other institutions of government 
that could have balanced out executive power. 
Moreover, the other proposed reforms have not 
since been implemented, most importantly the 
establishment of the CEP, which is discussed 
further below. 
This emphasis on the office of the executive was 
compounded by MINUSTAH’s disproportionate 
focus on presidential elections. Again, its 
intention here was not to demonstrate particular 
approval of or bias towards individual candidates; 
instead, the UN wanted to support the holding 
of elections that would likely otherwise not 
have taken place at all and to demonstrate to 
the population that they could make their voices 
heard at the ballot box,130 as well as to lay the 
groundwork for a viable working relationship 
with the president and to ensure some degree 
of political stability and continuity. As a result, 
in the various elections that took place while 
the mission was deployed, the UN not only 
provided vast amounts of technical support and 
capacity-building, but also tended to focus on 
the presidential elections, but pay less attention 
to parliamentary or local ones, even where there 
were clear irregularities. For example, the 2006 
elections, in which MINUSTAH played a major 
organizational role and which saw the election of 
René Préval as the first post-transition President, 
were marred by disputes over the electoral 
count.131 In response, MINUSTAH pushed for 
a recount of the presidential poll, but not the 
parliamentary one, sparking discontent on the 
part of opposition politicians.132
Subsequently, the then US Ambassador to Haiti 
described Préval as “a challenge” but also as 
“Haiti’s indispensable man.”133 While the UN’s view 
may not have been quite as overt, the mission 
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worked extremely closely with, and indeed 
expressed specific support for, the Core Group 
– consisting of the US as well as Brazil, Canada, 
France, Germany, Spain, and the EU – and thus 
it is likely that it shared their view that Préval 
was important for stability.134 Nevertheless, the 
mission’s aim was not to unfairly support Préval, 
and indeed its actions in light of the polling 
irregularities can be construed as an attempt 
to uphold the integrity of the process. However, 
because of an eagerness to demonstrate success 
in the conduct of the elections and concerns 
about security, the UN may have inadvertently 
helped to shore up a single candidate and 
signalled a particular interest in the President.
This pattern continued under the next President, 
Michel Martelly, who took power in 2011, 
following a flawed electoral process (see below). 
Martelly subsequently failed to hold elections 
between 2011 and 2015, despite the fact that 
the constitution calls for frequent elections for a 
proportion of the seats in the legislative. Instead, 
in late 2011, he dissolved the provisional CEP 
and only began forming a new one the following 
summer. By doing so, he was able to wait out the 
terms of one-third of senators, meaning that the 
senate was no longer quorate and therefore could 
not pass the necessary electoral laws.135 Later 
in 2014, Martelly signed the El Rancho Accord 
with opposition politicians, according to which 
the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary 
would each appoint three representatives to the 
CEP. However, this proposal violated the 1987 
Constitution, which requires that civil society also 
name representatives to the CEP. That, combined 
with the fact that the judiciary was regarded as 
largely controlled by the executive, led to the 
refusal of some senators to ratify the Accord.136 
This rendered the holding of elections impossible, 
and the terms of most Members of Parliament 
eventually lapsed. Parliament was subsequently 
dissolved in January 2015, and Martelly ruled by 
decree until the end of his term in 2016.137
However, even in the face of such overt 
authoritarian moves, the UN failed to sanction 
Martelly explicitly and instead continued to 
work with him as usual, therefore inadvertently 
buttressing his rule. Indeed, MINUSTAH, joined 
by the Organization of American States (OAS), 
blamed opposition politicians for blocking the 
passage of the new electoral law and thereby 
preventing the holding of elections, and 
MINUSTAH commended Martelly for “ensur[ing] 
the regular functioning of institutions and the 
continuity of the State.”138 While this conciliatory 
approach may have been intended to avoid a 
complete breakdown of the political system and 
instead to “create some power and authority in a 
country where the State [was] extremely weak,”139 
it also had the unintended side effect of signalling 
to Martelly that the costs of his behaviour were 
low and that the UN would likely put up with a 
high degree of authoritarianism in the interests 
of stability. While working with a fragmented and 
ever-changing parliament would of course have 
been problematic in many ways, the UN’s clear 
emphasis both on the office of the executive and 
on the individuals occupying it suggest that it 
valued stability and maintaining a steady working 
relationship with government above the quality 
of democratic processes. Ultimately, this led to a 
situation in which Presidents understood “that 
normal standards of behaviour [did] not apply 
to [them].”140
MINUSTAH’s focus on shoring up the executive 
and ensuring that elections ran smoothly came 
at the expense of building the capacity of other 
institutions of government that could have 
counterbalanced presidential power, and it 
particularly struggled to reform the judiciary.141 
As already discussed, MINUSTAH often prioritized 
the presidency over parliament, and the same 
was true of the CEP, the opposition, and local 
assemblies. Active support for the establishment 
of a permanent CEP, as mandated by the 
constitution, was one of the benchmarks in 
MINUSTAH’s 2013-2016 Consolidation Plan, but 
it was never implemented.142 While, of course, 
this is not only the result of MINUSTAH’s actions 
or inactions, and the UN’s influence with regards 
to institution-building was limited,143 the UN itself 
admitted that “the focus was on ensuring that 
the electoral events took place, while the other 
cycle elements, such as capacity-building, fell 
largely by the wayside.”144 Similarly, the mission 
interacted less with opposition and other political 
parties than it did with the presidency, thus failing 
to build the capacity of actors that could hold 
to account the executive, even if in the shorter 
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term this would have led to a more fragmented 
political environment.145 Finally, the mission also 
neglected regional and local assemblies. While 
MINUSTAH’s Civil Affairs Division had developed 
plans to engage with and strengthen ten 
regional governments, these plans were never 
implemented due to insufficient funding.146
In this way, MINUSTAH focused its attention on 
national elites associated with the executive, 
rather than with a broader set of actors 
who could have contributed to more open 
and democratic forms of governance in the 
country.147 Importantly, the UN’s intentions 
were not to encourage or sanction authoritarian 
behaviour or the concentration of power in single 
individuals or a single office. Indeed, it is likely 
that its actions prevented the electoral calendar 
from being jettisoned altogether and helped to 
avoid a descent into full political turmoil and 
widespread violence. However, because of its 
approval of constitutional reforms in favour 
of the presidency, its relative neglect of other 
institutions of government, and its relative 
disregard for decentralization, the mission 
contributed to the dominance of the executive, 
even one that was losing its legitimacy fast due 
to the failure to engage with parliament and the 
opposition,148 inadvertently signalling a high 
tolerance for authoritarian behaviour on the part 
of Haiti’s Presidents. 
THE UN AND SECURITY CAPACITY 
In the field of security, MINUSTAH risked 
contributing to authoritarian outcomes in a 
number of ways. First, the very presence of the 
UN mission reduced internal political threats to 
the Government and reduced the incentive for 
compromise and inclusive politics. One of the 
hallmarks of weakly institutionalized countries 
is a propensity for the irregular removal 
of leaders outside the usual constitutional 
rules and procedures. In Haiti, MINUSTAH’s 
strong security presence lowered the risk that 
incumbent Presidents would be ousted by 
force, and the operation consequently played 
a role in “insulat[ing] the political system from 
implosion.”149 Successive Presidents could 
rule in the knowledge that they were less 
likely to be ousted by their opponents through 
irregular means. For example, in 2012, President 
Martelly explicitly stated that MINUSTAH’s 
presence reduced the odds of a successful 
coup against him, and that that mission 
acted as a discouragement to opposition to 
his Government.150 This form of unintended 
consequence of the UN’s presence effectively 
reduced the incentive for the kind of inclusive 
politics or compromise that can contribute to 
democratic progress, and allowed instead for the 
consolidation and solidification of authoritarian 
tendencies within the incumbent administration.
Another form of influence related to the mission’s 
role in police reform. A crucial element of 
MINUSTAH’s mandate related to “monitoring, 
restructuring and reforming the Haitian National 
Police” (set out in UN Security Council Resolution 
1542), and police support had been a running 
theme of UN missions in Haiti from the mid-
1990s. When President Aristide was returned to 
power with UN support in 1994 after a coup had 
toppled his rule in 1991, he disbanded the Haitian 
army in order to reduce the military threat to 
civilian rule. Aside from destabilizing the security 
situation in Haiti by creating a constituency of 
disgruntled and armed ex-soldiers, this move 
had the effect of placing the weak national police 
service in the position of Haiti’s principal domestic 
security institution. UN support and capacity-
building in the security realm therefore focused 
in particular on the police force, and successive 
UN missions in the 1990s were dedicated to 
police training and monitoring.151
When MINUSTAH was deployed, the HNP was 
lacking basic professional standards. Its officers 
and leadership were linked to corruption, Haiti’s 
drug trade, and the pursuit of political rather 
than public service goals.152 Political elites sought 
to use the State’s security institutions to serve 
their own political ends, including by using the 
police to target anti-government protesters.153 
For example, Freedom House documented 
two instances when the HNP was used by the 
executive against political opponents: the arrest 
of a sitting Member of the Parliament, Arnel 
Bélizaire, who had clashed with Martelly but who 
should have been protected by parliamentary 
immunity; and house searches to intimidate the 
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head of the provisional election commission.154 
Between 2012 and 2017, anti-government 
demonstrations were increasingly met with 
police violence.155
MINUSTAH has been implicated in enabling 
some of these authoritarian practices through 
its relatively passive approach to police reform. 
Full-scale police reform was needed, including 
the vetting of HNP officers as many had been 
implicated in misconduct and mistreatment of 
the civilian population. Yet, MINUSTAH ultimately 
downgraded this ambitious goal, and no one was 
removed from the HNP due to misconduct.156 
It was also argued that the UN’s programme 
of support for the police lent legitimacy to 
an institution that was acting as an agent of 
democratic decline rather than development. 
As the former head of MINUSTAH’s police 
component lamented, the HNP, “while receiving 
important international assistance, contributed 
to the insecure environment…[and]…itself was 
fast becoming an illicit power structure.”157
Finally, in its anti-gang activities, MINUSTAH also 
at times used levels of force that were criticized 
as excessive and that again set a problematic 
precedent for national elites who, as discussed 
above, were prone to using the security services 
for their own political ends. New operations led 
to the death of several gang leaders, leading 
to questions about the rules of engagement 
guiding these more forceful interventions. 
In a major anti-gang initiative in July 2005 
(codenamed Operation Iron Fist), MINUSTAH 
peacekeeping troops went on the offensive in 
the notorious slum of Cité Soleil to target a key 
gang leader. Over the course of the operation, 
MINUSTAH troops fired over 20,000 rounds of 
ammunition, as well as grenades and mortars, 
in a high-density residential area with poor 
quality housing. Over 20 civilians are estimated 
to have been killed and the mission became a 
target of intense criticism and scrutiny in the 
aftermath.158 The use of what several experts 
have referred to as excessive force,159 in a setting 
where professionalization of the dysfunctional 
security services was a priority, not only risked 
undermining MINUSTAH’s own mandate but 
also setting a precedent for domestic elites and 
enabling the Haitian Government’s problematic 
use of political violence. 
Enabling by Signalling a 
Permissive Environment 
Aside from activities that helped bolster the 
security structures in Haiti and augmented the 
capacity of the State, MINUSTAH also reacted to 
episodes of electoral malpractice and political 
repression in ways that signalled a permissive 
environment for such practices. By offering 
muted concerns over the Government’s 
repressive tendencies, it repeatedly signalled that 
such behaviour would be tolerated. 
LAX RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL 
MALPRACTICE 
After MINUSTAH was deployed in 2004, one of 
the major priorities, aside from the restoration 
of State authority, was the organization of new 
elections to replace President Aristide. When the 
vote was finally held in 2006 after several delays, 
René Préval won slightly under 50 per cent of 
the vote, which required a run-off. The results 
sparked violence by Préval’s supporters, who 
feared a second round would be a ploy to steal 
the election from their favoured candidate. 
The spike in unrest led to intense levels of 
international concern, including within the UN 
operation. Protesters had overrun the lobby 
of Hotel Montana, where the vote tabulation 
was taking place and which was used as 
accommodation by MINUSTAH officials and 
visiting dignitaries. Préval was claiming outright 
victory and refused to consider going forward to 
a run-off election against his nearest competitor, 
Leslie Manigat. 
In a subsequent period of intense negotiations 
and international mediation, a key issue 
concerned the status of blank ballots that had 
been cast. To prevent further escalation, the Core 
Group recommended using the so-called Belgian 
Formula: blank votes were not treated as protest 
votes but instead allocated proportionally among 
the candidates based on the votes received 
by each of them.160 The Provisional CEP duly 
implemented this recommendation, assigning 51 
per cent of the vote to Préval and declaring him 
the winner in the first round. SRSG Juan Valdés 
(2004-2006) played the key role in this solution: 
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as Jean-Marie Guéhenno would later argue: 
“Valdés knew that a second round would just be 
an opportunity for an explosion of the violence 
he had managed to avoid. With the support of the 
Organization of American States and of the UN, 
wisdom prevailed, and a legal solution was found 
to avoid a second round of voting.”161
Yet, local civil society organizations questioned 
whether it was indeed a legal solution: the 
National Human Rights Defense Network 
criticized the situation in which “politics 
took precedence over the law’ and deplored 
that the CEP did not resist MINUSTAH’s 
pressure.”162 Mirlande Manigat, the wife of 
second-place candidate Leslie Manigat (and 
a future presidential candidate herself in 
2011), argued that the result illustrated the 
international community’s willingness to accept 
unconstitutional outcomes for the sake of 
international interests:
“Whenever there is a constitutional 
crisis in Haiti, one realizes that the 
international community is rather tolerant 
of the constitutional manipulation or even 
violation. We have witnessed this kind of 
reaction, or absence of reactions, when the 
international community deems it necessary 
not to criticize too openly those deviations 
in the name of realism, because they back 
the Haitians who appear to serve their 
interests and, above all, because they claim 
the necessity to abide by the law, a principle 
that they eagerly defend in their own 
national system.”163
Similar questions were raised over the 
international involvement in the 2010/11 
presidential elections that brought Michel 
Martelly to power. At the end of his term, 
Préval chose Jude Célestin, his son-in-law and 
Minister of Construction in his Government, as 
his successor and tried to stack the deck in his 
favour: Célestin was “the Government-backed 
candidate” although his campaign faced charges 
of fraud.164 Furthermore, a major political party, 
Fanmi Lavalas (associated with Aristide), was 
excluded from the elections on a technicality. 
Although concerns were raised at a Core Group 
meeting where SRSG Hédi Annabi (2007-2010) 
was present, the international community 
essentially decided to look the other way. US 
diplomatic cables from the time illustrate the 
strategy of “expressing disappointment” while 
continuing business more or less as usual, 
despite a recognition that Préval’s actions had 
“emasculated the opposition.”165
MINUSTAH also responded weakly once Martelly 
took office and revealed his shallow commitment 
to democracy. Soon after taking the office, 
“Martelly exposed a dangerous trend toward 
presidential absolutism in his unwillingness to 
deal with criticism, even from within his own 
ranks.”166 After blocking a series of elections 
and allowing the legislature to dissolve in the 
final year of his term, Martelly effectively ruled 
by decree and passed controversial measures 
benefitting family and friends.167 By not robustly 
criticizing electoral delays and manipulations, 
MINUSTAH helped signal the permissiveness of 
the international environment. 
LAX RESPONSE TO REPRESSION 
Besides the weak criticism of electoral delays and 
malpractice, MINUSTAH also offered only muted 
responses to a number of instances of political 
repression by Haitian authorities. This was 
recognized by the mission itself, and the former 
head of MINUSTAH’s police component argued 
the mission “appeared tolerant of illegal or at 
the very least inappropriate GoH [Government 
of Haiti] and HNP behaviour.”168
In 2014, Amnesty International concluded that 
despite multiple reports of excessive use of 
force by the police to disperse demonstrations, 
no officer faced criminal investigations, and 
stated that “both Haitian authorities and the 
MINUSTAH must show that they are committed 
to hold officers accountable for human rights 
violations and to prevent future abuses.”169 The 
HNP remained subject to political interference 
by political elites and, in 2011, the Inspector 
General resigned in protest of political pressure 
to stop investigating human rights abuses by 
the HNP.170 Considering HNP’s dependency on 
MINUSTAH, the leverage the mission had over 
the force was not used effectively to prevent 
politicization and co-optation. At the same time, 
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MINUSTAH was also dependent on the HNP for 
the progress of its capacity-building programme, 
and the HNP “often purposely evaded monitoring 
by MINUSTAH.”171
The March 2013 Secretary-General’s report 
on MINUSTAH acknowledged “allegations of 
anti-democratic practices’, including ‘alleged 
politicization of State institutions such as 
the judiciary and the Haitian National Police, 
in addition to repression of freedom of 
expression.”172 However, the report did not 
mention how MINUSTAH planned to address 
these issues and used very careful language 
referring to alleged wrongdoings, despite the 
mission’s ability to observe such practices 
independently. This timidity was partly the result 
of the loss of popular support and withering 
host State’s consent, as well as by the fears of 
destabilizing the executive.173 Yet, it served the 
purpose of signalling a permissive environment 
for the political misuse of the security services.
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C A S E  S T U D Y  3
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
has been one of the largest recipients of 
peacebuilding assistance from the international 
community over the past two decades. It is 
home to the largest peacekeeping mission in 
history, with over 22,000 authorized uniformed 
personnel at its peak in 2007,174 and has seen 
billions of dollars of international aid over the 
past two decades.
The UN’s involvement in Congo began in 1999, 
when the Security Council authorized and 
deployed the Mission de l’Organization des Nations 
Unies en Congo (MONUC) after the First Congo 
War (1996-97) and during the Second Congo War 
(1999-2002); the mission was rehatted as the 
Mission de l’Organization des Nations Unies pour 
la Stabilisation en RD Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010. 
The initial deployment was small and focused on 
ceasefire monitoring, planning for separation 
of forces, and liaison with parties to the conflict, 
and sometimes faced severe restrictions on 
movement and access under then President 
Laurent Kabila.175 This changed in 2003, after the 
signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement 
in Pretoria in December 2002 and the beginning 
of the formal transition period, which lasted until 
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006. 
MONUC’s authorized strength increased rapidly, 
and its mandate expanded to include a range 
of tasks, many of which entailed explicit and 
implicit efforts to build democratic governance 
and liberal political institutions. This included 
a focus on the rule of law, the strengthening of 
civil society, increasing the transparency and 
resilience of political institutions, expanding the 
inclusivity of decision-making, improving gender 
equality, and a range of other objectives that can 
be categorized as broadly liberal in nature. 
The centrepiece of this democratic focus was the 
2006 elections, which were the first multiparty 
elections in the country since independence. 
Altogether, the international community gave 
a massive USD 4 million to support these, and 
they were widely hailed a success. There was a 
very high turnout of 70.54 per cent in the first 
round and 65.36 per cent in the second and 
general agreement that they were conducted 
fairly and freely.176 There was some electoral 
violence both before and after polling, but this 
was mostly localized in the capital, Kinshasa, 
and was quickly brought under control. The 
elections constituted a moment of great 
optimism in Congo, both for the Congolese 
and for the international community, and there 
was hope that they marked a concrete turning 
point for the country that would see it embark 
on a more peaceful, inclusive, prosperous, and 
democratic future. 
Enabling in DRC
In spite of these high hopes for a more 
democratic future for Congo and the distinctly 
liberal objectives of the UN and its partners there, 
the country has seen increasingly autocratic 
behaviour on the part of the regime since 2006, 
in particular during the 13-year tenure of Joseph 
Kabila.177 While the factors contributing to this 
‘authoritarian turn’ are multiple and complex, and 
include both international and domestics ones, 
there is compelling evidence of enabling by the 
UN peace operation. The UN may not have been 
the only, or even the most important, factor in 
determining Congo’s governance trajectory since 
2003, but any understanding of that trajectory 
without accounting for the role of the UN is 
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incomplete. As discussed below, enabling in DRC 
has taken place through both of the mechanisms 
identified by von Billerbeck and Tansey – capacity-
building and signalling – as well as through the 
financial mechanisms discussed elsewhere in 
this report.178 Three main reasons for enabling 
can be identified: ongoing concerns relating 
to security and stability, the need to maintain 
government consent to the UN’s presence, and 
the desire to see a return on the international 
community’s sizeable financial investment in 
peacebuilding in the country. Importantly, with 
all three of these, the UN’s intention was not to 
promote authoritarianism – as noted, it was the 
exact opposite – but expanding the opportunity 
structures for authoritarian behaviour was an 
unintended consequence of UN action.
Enabling through Capacity-
building
The first mechanism through which the UN may 
have inadvertently enabled authoritarianism 
in Congo involves building incumbent capacity. 
Capacity-building is central to nearly all 
contemporary peacebuilding efforts because 
the shift from an environment governed by 
informal institutions, de facto ‘rules of the 
game,’ and elite bargains based upon kinship, 
personal relationships, or patron-client networks 
to one of formal governance, de jure rules, and 
stable bureaucratic institutions is considered 
key to sustainable peace.179 In Congo, capacity-
building has occurred in two areas: institutions 
and security.180
THE UN AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
The UN’s mandate in Congo included support 
to State institutions from the outset.181 Congo 
had a long history of dictatorship and corrupt 
governance. As noted, building resilient and 
technocratic institutions of government was and 
is considered a key step on the way to sustainable 
peace and inclusive governance for Congo – 
where disputes are resolved through dialogue 
and debate, legislative processes and economic 
regulation are transparent, the rule of law and 
economic regulations are equitably enforced 
throughout the entirety of the country, and the 
opposition, civil society, the media, and citizens 
can access and participate in the policymaking 
process.
However, in Congo, actions on the part of the 
UN and the international community more 
broadly in this regard inadvertently enabled 
authoritarian behaviour as early as 2003, when 
the institutional structures of the transitional 
government incentivized continued elite 
bargaining and the personalization of politics. 
This occurred in two ways: through the specific 
institutional arrangements of the transition 
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period and through the personalization of those 
arrangements in the incumbent, Joseph Kabila. 
First, the transitional arrangements put a heavy 
emphasis on the executive, through both the 
promulgation of a constitution that gave a 
high relative degree of power to the president, 
and through the structure of the transitional 
government known as the 1+4 arrangement, 
which consisted of one president and four vice-
presidents, drawn from the president’s party, the 
main opposition parties (MLC and RCD-G), and 
civil society respectively. This approach was taken 
because at the time the international community 
saw the president as critical to stability and to its 
own ability to remain deployed. Indeed, in spite 
of the great hope surrounding the 2006 elections, 
parts of the country, in particular eastern areas 
including Ituri District182 and North and South 
Kivu Provinces, were still seeing significant 
violence and instability during the transition 
period; a strong presidency, whose authority 
could be extended throughout the entire 
country, was seen as a buffer against a return to 
full-scale war. A strong presidency is not in itself 
inherently authoritarian, but in the case of Congo, 
the UN’s emphasis on the executive came at the 
expense of building other resilient, transparent 
institutions. As the Under-Secretary-General of 
Peacekeeping at the time, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, 
later reflected: “At enormous and unsustainable 
cost, the international community consolidated 
the presidency through elections and largely 
ignored the other institutions of the State.”183
Moreover, the 1+4 arrangement meant that the 
power of the vice-presidents was significantly 
more diluted than that of the president and his 
party. This both entrenched Kabila’s power, while 
also prompting other political actors to engage in 
deal-making and informal alliance-building with 
the dominant party in order to gain government 
positions or access rents in ways more typical 
of authoritarian regimes.184 Indeed, three of 
the four Vice-Presidents were broadly aligned 
with the President, even the representative 
of the opposition, Z’Ahidi Ngoma: rather than 
installing Etienne Tshisekedi, the long-time 
leader of the opposition and a stark opponent 
of Kabila’s, Ngoma was selected because he was 
considered a ‘friendlier’ figure. This was done 
deliberately because otherwise it ‘would have 
meant that three of the four vice-presidents were 
not in the president’s camp,’ a situation that the 
international community worried might weaken 
Kabila and potentially destabilize the country.185 
In this way, these institutional arrangements 
were made with the best intentions – to prevent 
a return to violent conflict – but they had the 
unintended effect of consolidating the power 
of the incumbent and weakening institutions 
of State that could act as a counterbalance to 
the presidency.
Second, not only was the office of the President 
prioritized during the transition, Joseph Kabila 
in specific was a key interlocutor for MONUC, 
more so than other members of the transitional 
government, inadvertently encouraging the 
personalization of politics more characteristic 
of authoritarian regimes than of democracies. 
Indeed, from when he took over from his father in 
2001 until the end of the transition in 2006, Kabila 
was the mission’s main point of contact in the 
government. Subsequently, during the electoral 
campaign in 2006, though the mission was 
ostensibly neutral and dealt on equal terms with 
Kabila and his electoral rivals, numerous staff 
privately admitted that he was “the consensus 
candidate”186 and the UN “had picked Kabila 
as the winner even before he won,”187 leading 
to accusations of bias by some Congolese 
politicians.188 MONUC’s preference for Kabila sent 
a strong message that, first, a vibrant and capable 
opposition was not a priority for the mission, 
and second, that Kabila had the international 
community’s strong support and that it therefore 
might tolerate diminished levels of transparency, 
political competition, and accountability in order 
to protect him. In other words, the personal 
political costs of authoritarian behaviour for 
Kabila were low, and his room for manoeuver 
in terms of taking actions that would further 
entrench his grip on power was wide.189
Importantly, the heavily personalized 
relationship of the mission with Kabila during 
the transition meant that later, when he won 
the 2006 elections and was inaugurated as 
President, the mission lost a significant amount 
of leverage with him. With the democratic seal 
of approval of an internationally-praised two-
round electoral process, Kabila immediately 
made moves to assert his sovereignty, at times 
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cutting off or delaying contact or consultations 
and raising the possibility of the UN’s withdrawal. 
Because the UN had worked so closely and even 
deferentially with Kabila up to that point, it was 
in a weak position to hold him to account or to 
push back on any undemocratic actions he took. 
Still, the mission generally preferred continuity 
over overt moves to pressure Kabila and its 
subsequent support for institutions entailed 
primarily efforts to turn over greater ownership 
and control to the Congolese, even where their 
non-democratic tendencies were growing. For 
example, in the 2011 and 2018 elections, as 
discussed below, MONUC took a backseat role, 
letting Congolese authorities drive and manage 
the process to a much greater extent than in 
2006. Support to the Commission Indépendente 
Nationale Electorale (CENI) was thus specifically 
‘neutral’190 and the UN, as one official argued: 
“[chose] not to do anything.”191 While this is partly 
a normal progression during peacebuilding, from 
heavier to lesser international influence, it took 
place against a backdrop of increasing assertive 
authoritarianism by the regime. 
THE UN AND SECURITY CAPACITY
The UN’s support to incumbent capacity also 
extended to the State security apparatus. This 
support has taken the form of trainings, logistical 
assistance, joint operations, and in particular 
the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which was 
established in 2013. The overarching objective 
of this support has been to build the capacity 
of the armed forces to provide security to the 
population in an equitable and neutral way, 
a task seen as particularly important in light 
of the fact that the military is composed of a 
sometimes uneasy mix of former militias, rebel 
groups, and armed forces and the fact that the 
authority of the central Government in some 
parts of the country is weak to non-existent.192 
However, the UN’s actions in this regard have 
also inadvertently enabled authoritarianism in 
two ways: by boosting the regime’s repressive 
capabilities and by further strengthening Kabila’s 
personal hold on power. 
First, MONUC and later MONUSCO have regularly 
assisted the Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) with training, 
logistical support, and joint patrols. While these 
activities are partly an ongoing task, support 
has been particularly extensive in the context 
of joint operations. For example, in 2009 the 
FARDC launched Kimia II, an operation targeting 
the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR) in eastern DRC, and MONUC’s support 
included transportation, fuel, rations, and limited 
firepower.193 In 2013, the UN went even further, 
with the establishment of the FIB, which took on 
peace enforcement measures and was tasked 
with ‘neutralizing non-State groups employing 
violence against civilians,’ in particular the M23, 
which was posing an existential threat to Kabila’s 
regime in North Kivu province at the time.194 The 
3,000-strong unit provided a variety of robust 
forms of material support, including long-range 
artillery, special forces, snipers, and drones to 
support ground operations carried out by the 
FARDC, and it resoundingly defeated the M23. 
Such operations, as well as the ongoing training 
and logistical support provided by the UN 
(and other bilateral partners), while aimed at 
extending State authority, restoring the rule of 
law, and building neutral, transparent security 
institutions, had two unintended effects that 
enabled authoritarian behaviour by the regime. 
First, the FARDC is responsible for widespread 
human rights abuses against the civilian 
population, including extrajudicial executions, 
rape, lootings, and abduction.195 By supporting 
these forces, the UN not only boosted the State’s 
legitimate coercive capacity as intended, but 
also its capacity to engage in repression against 
the civilian population. Some have argued that 
it thus became, in essence, complicit in these 
actions.196 To be fair, the UN recognized this 
risk and in 2009 instituted a vetting process 
whereby it would not cooperate with or provide 
support to FARDC commanders with records of 
human rights abuses. However, this strained 
relations with Kabila, something the UN was 
keen to avoid out of fear that the Government 
would impose restrictions on its movement 
or even withdraw consent to its presence. In 
addition, the Government quickly found ways 
around the conditionality policy, in particular 
by appointing black-listed commanders to lead 
operations where it wanted to avoid UN scrutiny 
or, as feared, restricting the movement of blue 
helmets.197 In many cases, the UN actually was 
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said to have lost oversight, thus potentially 
imperilling rather than protecting human rights, 
and often backed down in the face of the regime’s 
protests.198 Ultimately, the conditionality policy 
failed to deliver much benefit to the security 
of the Congolese population and the military 
support to the FARDC therefore contributed 
to forms of repression typical of authoritarian 
regimes, even though the mission’s intention 
was, in fact, just the opposite. 
Second, support to the FARDC helped to 
consolidate Kabila’s personal grip on power. By 
supporting the FARDC, the UN supplemented 
Kabila’s ability to coerce or eliminate actors 
challenging his power (or simply did it for 
him, as in the case of the M23) and to repress 
the domestic population if it became restive 
or demanded change, particularly in light of 
authoritarian actions on his part. This was not, 
of course, the UN’s intention, and the mission did 
not directly support such operations or activities. 
Indeed, weakening and in some cases eliminating 
non-State groups challenging the State’s 
authority, in particular in the east, was considered 
part of the UN’s mandate to restore and extend 
State authority throughout the country. However, 
because the State had become increasingly 
personalized in Kabila, the mission’s efforts in this 
regard were tantamount to individual support 
to him. The UN’s material support to the FARDC 
in essence turned it into “President Kabila’s own 
private military company,”199 and equipped him 
with the coercive capacity that authoritarian 
leaders need to ward off challenges and stay in 
power. Importantly, this support was not only 
material, but also constituted a strong signal of 
international support to Kabila, even in the face of 
his increasingly authoritarian moves, suggesting 
again that the UN would tolerate a high degree 
of ‘misbehaviour’ by the regime in the interests of 
maintaining stability and workable relations with 
the government. 
In its institutional and security support then, the 
UN inadvertently concentrated both political and 
coercive power in a personalized and repressive 
State. Where it faced trade-offs in this regard, 
as with the FARDC conditionality policy, it often 
backed down for fear that the Government would 
cease cooperation altogether, or even make 
good on threats to withdraw consent and expel 
the mission from the country. The UN did not 
intentionally support authoritarian behaviour by 
Kabila, but through its continued support to him 
and to State security forces, it shifted the balance 
of power in favour of Kabila and increased his 
power relative to political and military rivals. 
Enabling through Signalling 
and Expanding Opportunity 
Structure
The second mechanism through which the UN 
inadvertently enabled authoritarian behaviour 
by the regime was an informational one. 
More specifically, through lax enforcement 
of democratic standards, mild responses to 
repression, exclusion, and misconduct, and 
discretionary inaction in the face of explicit 
authoritarian behaviour, the mission signalled 
to Kabila that the costs of authoritarian conduct 
were low and that any repercussions were likely 
to be minimal or non-existent. The reasons for 
this are two-fold. First, as mentioned above, 
the UN had strongly associated continuity of 
leadership with stability and feared that punitive 
measures against the Government for less-than-
democratic behaviour could open the doors to 
political instability and violence. Second, almost 
immediately after his election, Kabila began 
asking for the withdrawal of the mission or at least 
a diminution in its size. The UN was therefore 
seriously concerned about the imposition of 
restrictions on its movement and operations and 
the withdrawal of consent to its deployment by 
the regime. In the interests of avoiding either 
of these eventualities, the UN responded mildly 
– first to instances of electoral misconduct and 
intimidation and second to instances of violent 
repression of citizens. Together, these indicated 
to Kabila that he had considerable leverage 
with the mission, and they created a permissive 
environment for authoritarianism.
ELECTORAL MISCONDUCT
As noted above, the 2006 elections were 
widely hailed as a success by the international 
community, but while the UN was officially 
neutral, there was a widely acknowledged bias 
in favour of Kabila. Not only was he seen as 
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important for stability, but he was also a familiar 
interlocutor for the UN – a kind of ‘devil we know’ 
– because of the extensive interaction between 
him and the mission during the transition 
period. As one UN official noted, the existing 
relationship between Kabila and the mission, 
even if at times tumultuous, “gave him a very 
good head start” in the elections.200 By contrast, 
the mission’s relationship with Kabila’s electoral 
rival, Jean-Pierre Bemba, was more tumultuous 
and antagonistic, and establishing a working 
relationship with him if he were to win was 
seen as both time-consuming and risky for a 
smooth changeover between the transitional 
government and the permanent one. Because of 
the immense investment in the elections made by 
the international community, the UN was eager 
to claim success, and Kabila was seen as more 
likely to enable the UN to do that. 
Furthermore, the UN’s implicit preference 
for Kabila remained in spite of the fact that he 
employed a number of repressive authoritarian 
tactics to increase his chances of winning. For 
example, a number of opposition politicians 
were detained for spurious reasons prior to 
the campaign period, and there were several 
incidents of intimidation of or violence against 
the press, including most egregiously, the murder 
of a Congolese journalist, Mwamba Bapuwa, 
shortly after he published articles critical of the 
State security forces.201 While the UN condemned 
such incidents in general terms, it never pointed 
fingers explicitly, and instead issued calls for all 
parties to cooperate. Taken together, MONUC’s 
unspoken preference for a Kabila electoral victory 
and for mediation and negotiation rather than 
robust sanctioning of electoral misconduct 
formed a discursive pattern that signalled the 
mission’s willingness to accept behaviour from 
Kabila that diverged from its own liberal goals. 
In this way, as Weiss contends: “Kabila owe[d] 
his victory in no small part to…the longstanding 
support that he received from the international 
community,” including MONUC.202
This discursive pattern became even more 
extreme during the 2011 presidential elections, 
with a marked lack of action by the UN in the face 
of increasingly authoritarian behaviour. Early that 
year, the Government amended the constitution 
in favour of a first-past-the-post system, 
eliminating the second-round requirement and 
making it easier for the incumbent to win.203 
The mission (renamed MONUSCO by then) was 
staunchly against this move, but ultimately “there 
was no resistance to it”204 and the UN did nothing 
to sanction Kabila explicitly when the change was 
confirmed. More seriously, in response to reports 
of killings, disappearances, and arbitrary arrests 
during the electoral period, the mission issued 
some discursive denunciations, but did not alter 
its support to or interaction with the regime, and 
instead hailed the positive cooperation between 
MONUSCO and DRC military and civilian justice 
authorities. Indeed, because Kabila had become 
increasingly uncooperative towards the mission 
and had indicated on several occasions that he 
wanted it to withdraw, MONUSCO was focused 
largely on maintaining a minimally workable 
relationship with him. It therefore often issued 
only muted criticism of the regime in the 
interests of retaining consent and preventing a 
subsequent likely degeneration of the security 
situation. This loss of leverage was compounded 
by the fact that, as mentioned, the UN played 
a much smaller logistical role in the 2011 
elections, and it therefore had less oversight of 
the conduct of State electoral officials and that 
of the candidates. Subsequently, when the 
elections were widely declared as fraudulent by 
independent observers, the UN again stuck to 
mild criticism and maintained its interaction with 
Kabila much as it had been.205 As one UN official 
put it, the mission wanted “to continue business 
as usual.”206
Finally, this pattern of discursive leniency and 
discretionary inaction largely remained in place 
during the build-up to and subsequent two-year 
delay in the 2016 elections (eventually held in 
2018). In spite of being constitutionally barred 
from running for a third term, Kabila made a 
range of attempts to circumvent this and to delay 
the elections. These included trying to change the 
constitution; a reformed electoral law in 2015 
that attempted to push through a census prior to 
any elections (which would have delayed polling 
and allowed Kabila to stay in office); and the 
elimination of electoral rivals, including the arrest 
of Moise Katumbi, the popular then Governor of 
Katanga Province, who was widely seen as having 
good chances nationally. These efforts, and in 
particular the proposed changes to the electoral 
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law, sparked widespread protest among donors 
and large public demonstrations, which were 
violently suppressed by the regime, resulting 
in extensive arrests and civilian deaths.207 While 
the UN was of course against these moves by 
Kabila, strongly condemned the violence and 
intimidation, and indeed lobbied successfully, if 
quietly, for him to give up his attempts to amend 
the constitution, the mission also continued its 
interaction with the Government largely as usual 
and its public condemnations were muted. As 
previously, the mission remained concerned 
both about losing Government consent to its 
presence and the potential for insecurity that 
might accompany restrictions on its operations 
or its withdrawal should State consent falter. 
Yet, while these were indeed valid concerns and 
their realization could have spelled the collapse 
of years of material and operational investment 
in peacebuilding, MONUSCO’s failure to sanction 
the regime in more forceful or public ways was 
symptomatic of its greatly reduced leverage with 
the regime and signalled a high level of tolerance 
for authoritarian behaviour and an interest 
in continuity and stability above democratic 
development.
Ultimately, the elections in 2018 ended up 
with a political arrangement made between 
Kabila and members of the opposition. Finally 
persuaded not to run, Kabila’s party put forward 
Emmanuel Shadary, a Kabila loyalist widely 
viewed as a puppet candidate so that Kabila could 
retain control. Shadary was, however, roundly 
defeated, and Martin Fayulu, an opponent of 
Kabila’s, largely acknowledged as the legitimate 
winner.208 Faced with a much greater loss of 
power, Kabila quickly proceeded to make a 
deal with second-place Felix Tshisekedi, son of 
Etienne Tshisekedi and the ‘least objectionable’ 
candidate for Kabila, that manipulated the results 
to install Tshisekedi as President in exchange 
for Kabila loyalists retaining most important 
Government posts.209 An appeal was lodged with 
the Constitutional Court, but the court confirmed 
Tshisekedi’s victory. International and national 
observers, analysts, and the press forcefully 
declared the elections a “huge fraud”210 and “a 
defeat for democracy.”211 By contrast, the mission 
‘wanted to be neutral,’ and so rather than issue 
forceful statements demanding open disclosure 
of the results, it took the stance that it “should 
not interfere” and should “respect…the result 
as given by the CENI.”212 This noncommittal 
stance can again be attributed to its concern 
for the security situation. Even if the outcome 
did not represent the democratic will of the 
people, from the UN’s perspective, peacefully 
conducted elections without widespread 
violence constituted a success. As one official 
noted: “it was better compared to what we had 
expected.”213 Another UN official similarly recalled 
that “instead of saying that we do not recognize 
the results of the elections, the international 
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community recognized the fact that it was a 
peaceful election.”214 While, of course, free and 
fair elections were a priority for the UN, when 
faced with a perceived choice between that and 
potential violence and instability – an eventuality 
that was indeed likely should Kabila have lost – 
the UN opted to for a course of nonaction that it 
thought would least ‘rock the boat.’ 
FRAUD, AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS, AND 
REPRESSION
UN enabling of authoritarian behaviour did not 
just emerge during electoral periods in Congo, 
but has also persisted between them, in particular 
with regards to repression against challenges 
to or criticism of Kabila’s rule by the opposition 
and others. The same rationale existed as during 
elections – that too much political competition 
could weaken Kabila to such an extent that it 
could trigger renewed fighting and that extensive 
condemnation of the regime could result in 
the withdrawal of consent for the mission. 
Accordingly, when the Government engaged in 
opaque or corrupt political deal-making or violent 
repression of the population, the UN’s response 
was muted, signalling a permissive environment 
for authoritarianism. 
This dynamic emerged as soon as Kabila 
was formally installed as President following 
the 2006 elections. In early 2007, there were 
widespread allegations of fraud and vote-buying 
in gubernatorial elections, but this resulted 
in no censure and indeed little reaction at all 
from MONUC. Kabila also took liberties in 
appointments to key Government posts in order 
to ensure that key decisions were kept within 
the executive. For example, Adolphe Muzito, the 
second Prime Minister after the 2006 elections, 
was instructed not to take any important 
spending decisions without the President’s 
consent. Decision-making authority in other 
important Government portfolios, in particular 
relating to mining, defence, and border control 
were also retained by Kabila in “a system of 
decision-making that [ran] parallel to the formal 
structures of government.”215 Later, in 2013, Abbé 
Apollinaire Malu Malu was appointed head of the 
CENI, but was seen by many as too close to Kabila, 
resulting in protests and discontent by opposition 
politicians. However, the UN remained mostly 
silent in the face of these kinds of actions, taking 
the view that it must defer to the Government, 
now sovereign and democratically elected 
and able to pull its support for the mission.216 
Again, this is partly the ‘normal’ trajectory for a 
mission – that it becomes gradually less involved 
in national politics – but in this case, the UN’s 
inaction took place in the face of sometimes 
blatant democratically questionable moves by 
the Government and reflected its own loss of 
leverage with Kabila.
Kabila’s increasingly authoritarian behaviour 
over the course of his tenure as President 
extended well beyond political horse-trading into 
human rights abuses and violent repression of 
challengers. In 2007, Kabila launched punitive 
military offensives against Bemba and members 
of his party in Kinshasa, which resulted in 
hundreds of civilian deaths. To its credit, MONUC 
played a key role in helping civilians to safety, 
protecting Mouvement de Liberation Congolais 
(MLC) security guards, and monitoring the 
situation; however, it subsequently delayed the 
publication of its reports about the incident to 
avoid angering Kabila and risking a withdrawal 
of consent. Similarly, the Government launched 
particularly brutal operations against Bundu Dia 
Kongo, a politico-religious group based in the 
west of the country, in 2007 and in 2008, with over 
100 deaths each time. While MONUC investigated 
the incidents, it did not penalize the Government 
in any particular way, limiting its condemnations 
and accepting at face value Kabila’s promises 
that he would hold perpetrators of extrajudicial 
killings and torture accountable – promises 
that he did not keep.217 More recently, between 
2013-14, the Congolese National Police (PNC) 
launched Operation Likofi, a brutal crackdown 
on violent organized criminal gangs known as 
kuluna in Kinshasa, which included extrajudicial 
executions and forced disappearances. When 
the UN Joint Human Rights Office published a 
report on these operations, its director, Scott 
Campbell, was declared persona non grata and 
expelled from the country.218 While the UN in-
country, as well as in New York, forcefully and 
publicly condemned Campbell’s expulsion, it did 
not substantially change its interactions with 
the Government or its other operations in the 
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country, for fear that doing so would further 
imperil its ability to monitor the human rights 
situation in the country.
More recently, Kabila has targeted political 
opponents and cracked down on civil society 
organizations critical of or lobbying against the 
Government. In 2015, for example, students 
printing flyers in support of Vital Kamerhe’s 
Union pour la Nation Congolaise (UNC) party 
were arrested; Kamerhe was a long-time ally of 
Kabila’s who subsequently broke with him and 
ran against the President in the 2011 elections.219 
Jean-Claude Muyambo, former Minister of 
Humanitarian Affairs and later of Social Affairs 
and President of the SCODÉ party, and Ernest 
Kyaviro, head of the opposition RCD/K-ML 
party, were also arrested shortly after calling for 
protests against the reforms to the electoral law 
discussed above, though the Government denied 
that that was the reason.220 Outside of political 
circles, prominent civil society organizations, such 
as Filimbi and LUCHA, have found themselves 
in the government’s line of fire as well, with 
harassment and detention of their members 
by the authorities and their peaceful protests 
brutally dispersed by the security forces.221 In 
2018, Luc Nkulula, one of LUCHA’s leaders and 
an ardent pro-democracy activist in Congo, 
died in a suspicious fire at his home in eastern 
Congo, though the authorities reject allegations 
of foul play.222 The press has also been targeted, 
in particular when covering stories relating to 
the elections and popular protests against the 
electoral law.223
In the face of all of these incidents, the 
UN’s reactions entailed mostly standard 
condemnations and calls for restraint and 
respect for the rule of law, but did not result 
in strong censure of the regime or any major 
reconfiguration in the way it interacted with the 
Government. While in private, the UN has applied 
pressure on Kabila, it has curbed public forms of 
naming and shaming for fear that doing so would 
result in restrictions on the UN’s movements 
and operations, a weakening of consent, and 
a deterioration of working relations with the 
Government, which would ultimately inhibit 
its ability to promote security and monitor the 
human rights situation at all.
Conclusion
This case study presents only a sampling 
of the evidence of Congo’s slide towards 
authoritarianism; however, it shows a clear 
trajectory over time, starting during the 2003-06 
transition and continuing throughout Kabila’s 
tenure as President until 2018. While there are 
multiple reasons explaining this trajectory, the 
role of the UN in enabling it is notable. MONUC 
and later MONUSCO did not of course intend to 
abet authoritarian behaviour by Kabila – indeed, 
to the contrary, its mandated tasks were broadly 
liberal and its intentions were to open up political 
space, reduce abuses and repression, and extend 
equitable State authority. Yet, its efforts to 
achieve these objectives, including both material 
and rhetorical support to the Government, also 
had unintended effects that increased regime 
capacity for authoritarian behaviour and 
signalled that such behaviour would be tolerated. 
Broadly speaking, these unintentional effects 
were the result of the conflicting obligations 
the UN faced in Congo: on the one hand, it was 
tasked with promoting democratic governance; 
on the other, it was tasked with maintaining 
security, retaining consent to its presence, and 
demonstrating successes to its international 
donors, particularly with regards to elections. 
Where these two sets of objectives conflicted, the 
UN usually selected – advertently or inadvertently 
– to prioritize security and consent.
Since the inauguration of Tshisekedi in 2018, 
there are some indications that the situation 
may be changing. Though at first constrained 
by Kabila’s behind-the-scenes control and the 
many Kabila loyalists in top posts, Tshisekedi is 
gradually pushing back and starting to eliminate 
the latter from Government. It remains to be 
seen if this will significantly alter the current 
governance path of the country, but there do 
seem to be somewhat improved relations 
between the Government and MONUSCO, 
suggesting that there may be a slight opening up 
of room to manoeuver for the UN.
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